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DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION
Warren E. Georget
An increasing number of nations provide legal assistance pro-
grams for their poor citizens.' Generally, these nations have recog-
nized that an assistance program tied to the executive branch of
government is reluctant to place its clients' interests above those of
government or else is an inviting target for political interference.
Thus, almost without exception, nations providing legal assistance
for the poor have insulated their programs from political pressure.2
Until recently, the one significant exception was the legal ser-
vices program of the United States. It was a creature of the executive
branch and was subject to political attack whenever its efforts to
secure the legal rights of poor citizens conflicted with entrenched
interests. The program's history shows an almost continuous effort
to restrict the activity of legal services attorneys and to control the
free exercise of their professional judgment. Most of these efforts
were spawned by a misunderstanding of the role that professionally
independent lawyers play in representing clients, 3 a role that in-
cludes working to change existing law on behalf of clients.4
t Member of the New York and California Bars; Legal Assistant to the Chairman of the
Board of Directors, Legal Services Corporation, 1975. A.B. 1964, Brown University; J.D. 1971,
Cornell University. The views expressed herein are the author's and not those of the Legal
Services Corporation.
' See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES ix-x (1975) [hereinafter cited as
TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE].
2 See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE 229-30.
3 Canon 7 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY requires a lawyer to
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law. Ethical Consideration 7-1 elaborates:
The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profes-
sion which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect
available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each
member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in
accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible
means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense.
Indeed, private practitioners engaged in pro bono work on behalf of the poor take these same
approaches to discharging their professional responsibilities. For example, during 1975 the
San Francisco Lawyers' Committee for Urban Affairs litigated to establish the right of tenants
to sue landlords for breach of implied warranty of habitability, to challenge state prison
restrictions on visitation privileges, and to challenge a statute excluding debtors without
families from obtaining exemptions to wage garnishments. San Francisco Lawyers Committee
for Urban Affairs, 1975 Annual Report 6 (Nov. 1975). See also Sullivan, Law Reform and the
Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 28 n.91 (1971).
' Canon 8 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY and Ethical Consideration
681
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The passage of the Legal Services Corporation Act,5 and the
concomitant separation of the program from the executive branch,
is therefore an important milestone in the history of this nation's
legal services program. The Act recognizes the need to protect the
program from political interference and to ensure the professional
independence of legal services attorneys. The Act's significance can
only be understood, however, by briefly reviewing both the history
of the legal services program and the history of the Act itself.
Furthermore, the basic features of the Act must be analyzed to
determine whether it will provide effective, independent legal ser-
vices for the poor.6
I
DEVELOPMENT OF A CORPORATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES: THE
NEED FOR INSULATION FROM POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
As this nation entered the 1960's, the government and the bar
at virtually all levels were unresponsive to the needs of the poor for
legal assistance. The existing private legal aid societies-financed
almost exclusively by charitable contributionsT-were operating on
modest budgets,8 and legal aid attorneys were underpaid, over-
worked, and susceptible to pressure from their financial backers. 9
The bar took refuge in its apathy by characterizing private legal aid
as a buffer against socialization of the legal profession' ° and by
condemning suggestions that government provide legal assistance to
the poor. Nevertheless, by 1965 the federal government had largely
assumed this responsibility by establishing a legal services program
within the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)." It did so with
the reluctant approval of the national bar.'2
Almost from the outset of the federally-funded program, how-
8-2 require that "[i]f a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law, substantive
or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means
to obtain appropriate changes in the law."
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-961 (Supp. IV, 1974).
6 See generally Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339 (1975).
7 See E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM 14-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE & REFORM].
8 See, e.g., The Legal Aid Society, Annual Report 1967 ($3 million expenditures).
S See J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 50 (1967).
10 See Marden, Legal Aid, the Private Lauer and the Community, 20 TENN. L REV. 757,
759-61 (1949). See also 75 ABA REPORTS 93-95 (1950).
' See note 47 infra.
12 The conversion of the ABA from opponent to supporter of government-funded legal
services is described in JuSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 43-64.
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ever, the professional independence of its attorneys became a politi-
cal embarrassment to groups outside the executive branch. Gradu-
ally this independence made the program a political liability to the
Executive as well. A number of attempts were therefore made to
limit the attorneys' independence, chiefly by giving greater control
over local legal services offices to groups outside the program. For
the most part such attempts were unsuccessful, but it became obvi-
ous that if the program was to retain professional integrity, then it
would need to be shielded from political pressure and interference.
Proposals to establish an independent corporate home for the pro-
gram and the eventual development of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion were direct responses to the political vulnerability of the OEO
Legal Services Program.
A. Threats from Outside
The history of groups outside the executive branch attempting
to limit the independence of legal services attorneys parallels the
development of California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA)-an or-
ganization designated by OEO in 1968 as the "outstanding legal
services program of the year,"'13 and in 1970 as "one of the best
Legal Services programs in the nation."'14 One reason for CRLA's
success was its ability to cope with the intractable problems that beset
legal services projects.15 It developed, in consultation with client
advisory committees, a priority system to deal with the problem of
limited resources and a potentially limitless case load. 16 In addition
to emphasizing "service cases" and "routine matters,"' 7 CRLA attor-
neys instituted litigation on problems affecting large numbers of
clients. 18 Moreover, CRLA conducted regular training and evalua-
'" Falk & Pollak, Political Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy
and the Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 607 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRLA
Controversy]. Along with William F. McCabe, the authors of CRLA Controversy were counsel to
CRLA in the hearings that followed Governor Reagan's veto of the 1971 OEO grant to CRLA.
See notes 34-43 and accompanying text infra.
14 OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld so characterized CRLA in a press release dated
December 1, 1970, a few weeks before Governor Reagan vetoed the 1971 funding for CRLA.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1970, at 20, col. 4 (city ed.). See notes 35-46 and accompanying text infra.
'" These problems, caseload management and staffing, are discussed later in the context
of the backup center controversy. See notes 191-205 and accompanying text infra.
"8 See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 606; 119 CONG. REc. 20,697-98 (1973) (remarks
of Representative Heinz). The average CRLA attorney caseload in fiscal year 1968-69 was 429.
See OEO, REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ON CALIFORNIA
RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC. 34-35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N REPORT].
17 See CRLA Controversy 606. Cases involving routine problems of the poor are known as
"service cases." Such routine matters often involve "housing, civil rights, welfare and con-
sumer problems." Id.
18 It was estimated that 95-98% of the legal matters handled by CRLA were routine, and
19761
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tion of its staff and instituted a backup system to coordinate efforts
of local offices on common legal problems and difficult cases.' 9
Although it did not often resort to litigation,20 CRLA was ex-
traordinarily successful when it did so.2 In one of its earliest cases,
California was forced to restore $2 10 million in cutbacks incorrectly
made in the state's "Medi-Cal" program. 22 The case had political
repercussions because it prevented former Governor Reagan from
fulfilling a campaign promise to balance the state budget. 23 In other
cases, CRLA attorneys forced implementation of a minimum wage
for farmworkers, 24 blocked the importation of cheap foreign farm
laborers, 25 and obtained expansion of the federal food stamp and
school lunch programs.
26
CRLA's success aroused considerable political hostility. In 1967,
California's Senator George Murphy proposed legislation that
would have prevented federally-funded legal services programs,
and hence CRLA, from suing any federal, state, or local agency.27
Senator Murphy's amendment was defeated, 2  but Governor
that roughly 80% of project time was spent in dealing with service cases. COMM'N REPORT
34-35. Eighty-nine percent of the legal problems handled by CRLA between July 1, 1968, and
June 30, 1969, involved individual clients. 115 CONG. REC. 38,816 (1969) (remarks of Rep-
resentative Tunney).
" See CRLA Controversy 605.
20 In fiscal year 1969-70, only 8% of the 9,705 cases closed by CRLA attorneys involved a
court proceeding. COMM'N REPORT 35. See Karabian, Legal Services for the Poor: Some Political
Observations, 6 U.S.F.L. REV. 253, 257 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Political Observations]. In fiscal
year 1968-69, CRLA attorneys filed 63 class actions-less than one-half of one percent of the
program's total caseload. See 115 CONG. REC. 38,816 (1969) (remarks of Representative
Tunney).
21 CRLA attorneys were successful in 84% of their court cases concluded in fiscal year
1969-70. Their success rate in administrative decisions during the same period was 88%.
COMM'N REPORT 34.
22 Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967). For a
discussion of this case as well as others as a measure of the legal services program's cost-
effectiveness, see JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 230-33, 368-70 & nn. 229, 236.
2 See Arnold, Whither Legal Services, JuRis DOCTOR, Feb. 1971 at 3-4; Schardt, Legal
Services: Round II, 2 Civ. LIB. REv. 39, 42 (1975).
24 In Riviera v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1968), the court ordered a 25 cent per hour wage increase for 200,000 California farmwork-
ers. Earl Johnson estimated the case was "worth" $100 million per year to farmworkers.
JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 344 n.85, 369-70 n.236.
25 See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 607.
26 See id. See also Political Observations, supra note 20, at 258.
27 See 113 CONG. REC. 27,871-73 (1967). Senator Murphy's proposal was in the form of an
amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act. In urging the Senate to support his amend-
ment, Senator Murphy referred generally to CRLA and specifically to the suit against the
Department of Labor to stop importation of Mexican "braceros." Id. at 27,871.
2 Id. at 27,873. The vote was 36 for, 52 against. Vigorous lobbying by the organized bar
prevented introduction of the amendment in the House. See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7,
at 339 n.41.
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Reagan was so angered by CRLA's activities that he threatened to
veto their funding for 1968,29 although a veto would have been
subject to override by the OEO Director.30 In 1969, Senator Murphy
introduced another amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act
(EOA) that would have removed the OEO Director's override power
and given a governor absolute veto power over federal funding of
any legal services program in his state.3 ' The Senate passed this
amendment,3 2 but the House rejected it after intensive lobbying by
the organized bar.3 3 In conference, the Senate eventually dropped
the Murphy amendment.
3 4
A challenge to CRLA's very existence came in 1970. On De-
cember 1, 1970, OEO announced that CRLA would receive a $1.8
million grant for 1971. On December 26, 1970, Governor Reagan
vetoed the 1971 funding.3 5 Several weeks later ajustification for the
veto-the Uhler Report-was delivered to OEO.36 This report ac-
cused CRLA attorneys of a "blatant indifference to the needs of the
poor ... [and] a disposition to use their clients as ammunition in
their efforts to wage ideological warfare. '3 7 After giying CRLA an
emergency thirty-day grant while it reviewed the report, OEO an-
29 See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 609. Governor Reagan finally did not veto the
funding, offering to withhold the veto in exchange for grant restrictions on the activities of
CRLA attorneys. Id.
30 Reagan's power as Governor to veto CRLA funding was pursuant to statutory author-
ity in the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970), but was subject to override by
the OEO Director.
31 See 115 CONG. Rc. 29,894 (1969). Senator Murphy again focused on the alleged
abuses of CRLA as a justification for his proposal:
The program was not to set up a bank of lawyers to enjoin the California State
Legislature, or the Secretary of Labor, or the Governor of the State .... That is the
tack that has been followed by the California Rural Legal Assistance.
Id. at 29,896.
32 Id. at 29,897-98.
" See Robb, Controversial Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.A.J. 329, 331 (1970);
115 CONG. REc. 38,793 (remarks of Representative Reid: "President Nixon, Chief Justice
Burger, OEO Director Rumsfeld, and virtually every national bar and legal association have
spoken out against the Murphy amendment."); 115 CONG. REc. 38,822 (1969) (remarks of
Representative Wyatt: "The list of opponents to the Murphy amendment and supporters of
legal services reads like a Who's Who.").
34 115 CONG. R c. 40,461 (1969) (remarks of Representative Perkins).
" See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 610. Although it had been anticipated, no
advance notice of the veto was given to CRLA. See id. at 609-10.
36 CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, A STUDY AND EVALUATION OF
CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL AssIsTANCE, INC. (1971) The Report cited numerous incidents of
alleged misconduct by CRLA over a four year period. See Political Observations, supra note 20, at
259; 119 CONG. REC. 20,697 (1973) (remarks of Representative Heinz).
37 CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 36, at 191. Reagan had also
characterized CRLA attorneys as "ideological ambulance chasers." See Falk & Pollak, What's
Wrong With Attacks on the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 1288 (1972).
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nounced in late January 1971 that the Reagan veto would stand until
the charges of misconduct could be considered by an OEO-
appointed commission. 38 CRLA was given six months interim fund-
ing pending the outcome of the investigation.39 A three-judge com-
mission was appointed in March 1971, and assurances were given
that if the commission found that CRLA's activities complied with
the OEO statute and guidelines, then the program would be re-
funded "in full."' 40 After twenty days of public hearings, including
testimony by 164 witnesses, the commission filed a 400 page report
that concluded:
[T]he complaints contained in the Uhler Report and the evidence
adduced thereon do not, either taken separately or as a whole,
furnish any justification whatsoever for any finding of improper
activities by CRLA....
The Commission expressly finds that in many instances the
[Uhler Report] has taken evidence out of context and misrep-
resented the facts to support the charges against CRLA. In so
doing, the Uhler Report has unfairly and irresponsibly subjected
many able, energetic, idealistic and dedicated CRLA attorneys to
totally unjustified attacks upon their professional integrity and
competence.
From the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits received in
evidence and the Commission's examination of the documents
submitted in support of the charges in the [Uhler Report], the
Commission finds that these charges were totally irresponsible and
without foundation.
41
The commission also found that CRLA had provided legal assis-
tance "in a highly competent, efficient and exemplary manner" and
thus urged that CRLA "be continued and refunded. 42
" See Political Observations, supra note 20, at 259. Acting OEO Director Carlucci, although
acknowledging the weakness of the Uhler Report, neither overrode nor sustained the veto.
Reagan spent most of the week preceding the OEO announcement in Washington, apparently
to ensure that no override would be made without an investigation. See Arnold, supra note 23,
at 4. He apparently hinted that California's support of former President Nixon's renomina-
tion at the 1972 GOP convention hung in the balance. See Schardt, supra note 23, at 42.
39 See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 618; Political Observations, supra note 20, at 259.
40 See Political Observations 259.
" COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 83-84. The three-judge commission's report also
stated:
It should be noted that California State OEO and its Director, Mr. Uhler, were
repeatedly invited and urged by the Commission to participate in the hearings ....
The State OEO and its Director repeatedly refused to participate or to present any
evidence to support the charges in the Uhler Report.
Id. Uhler's refusal to participate in hearings to investigate charges made by him was never
explained. See Political Observations 260.
42 COMM'N REPORT 88. William L. Knecht, Assistant Counsel to the California Farm
Bureau, branded the commission's report a "whitewash." See Arnold, And Finally, 342 Days
[Vol. 61:681
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At first, OEO refused to release the commission report to CRLA
until a decision on the Reagan veto could be made. CRLA then filed
suit to force immediate release of the report.43 Meanwhile, OEO
director Carlucci flew to California to consult with Reagan. A com-
promise was finally reached which ended the controversy: CRLA
was given a seventeen month grant, which Reagan approved, and
California was given a $2.5 million grant to establish an experimen-
tal legal services program for low-income citizens.44
Although the ultimate result was a victory for CRLA, the
lengthy battle undermined the morale of staff and drained energy
and resources that could have been better used in serving the legal
needs of the poor.45 The battle also demonstrated how vulnerable
even the best of legal services projects was to the irresponsible use of
political power. Nor was the veto against CRLA an isolated incident.
Legal services refundings were vetoed in Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota.
46
B. Threats from Inside
A series of developments within OEO also demonstrated the
political vulnerability of a legal services program located in the
executive branch. Although not specifically authorized by the
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), the Legal Services Program
(LSP) was established in 1967 as a "national emphasis" program
administered within OEO's Community Action Program (CAP).
47
By 1966 Congress was making direct appropriations to LSP,48 but
the poorly-defined relationship between CAP and LSP,49 and CAP's
Later.. ., JURIs DOCTOR, Sept. 1975, at 32, 35. Knecht was later nominated to become a
director of the Legal Services Corporation. See text accompanying notes 132-33 infra.
43 See CRLA Controversy, supra note 13, at 636-39.
44 See id. at 639-41.
45 See 119 CONG. REc. 20,697-98 (1973) (remarks of Representative Heinz).
46 See JuSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 91, 193; Pearson, To Protect the Rights of the Poor:
The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1971, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 641, 646 (1971); Note, The Legal
Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231, 260 n.98 (1971). OEO
overrode the Missouri Governor's veto, but was advised that its action had cost the Republican
party votes. See Lenzner, Legal Services Fights for the Poor, But Who Fights for Legal Services?,
Juis DOCTOR, Feb. 1971, at 10. Furthermore, a stated intention to veto any federal legal
services grant to South Dakota kept a program out of that state for five years. Note, supra, at
260 n.98.
47 See JUSTICE & REFORM 138-40. Congress stated that financial assistance to Community
Action Programs was not limited to programs named in the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964. Act of October 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat. 973-74.'
48 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 211-1(b), 80 Stat. 1451.
49 See JuSTICE & REFORM 146-49; Robb, Poverty Lauyer's Independence-Battle CryforJustice,
1 N.M.L. REv. 215, 221-23 (1971).
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continued control over funding of local projects,50 hindered the
development of LSP and left it vulnerable to local political pres-
sure.5 1 Moreover, the requirement that local projects furnish twenty
percent of their costs increased this pressure.52 In some areas, essen-
tial private funding was withdrawn after LSP sued local agencies
that, directly or indirectly, were sources of such funding.
53
The most serious internal threat to LSP, however, was a series
of attempts to "regionalize" OEO. Believing that the failure of its
war on poverty stemmed from administrative inefficiency, OEO
hired a consultant to study its management and make recommenda-
tions for change. The resulting McKinsey Report5 4 argued in favor
of regionalization: a transfer of authority over OEO programs to
regional directors.5 5 The McKinsey Report also recommended that
LSP give up its power to approve grants and select personnel.
Moreover, regional LSP staff were to serve CAP staff-nonlaw-
yers-in an advisory capacity and relinquish operational control
over local projects. "Thus, with one deft stroke the McKinsey report
recommendations threatened to excise lawyer control from the
Legal Services Program.
'56
To block OEO implementation of the recommendations, Rep-
resentative O'Hara suggested that language affirming the need for
an autonomous LSP be inserted in a report of the House commit-
tee having jurisdiction over OEO.5 7 This tactic, and effective lobby-
ing by the organized bar, temporarily blocked the threat to the
professional independence of LSP lawyers.58 Subsequently, The Na-
tional Advisory Committee59 formally stated the organized bar posi-
'0 See Robb, supra note 49, at 221-23.
For example, Mayor Richard Daley was chairman of an OEO-funded CAP, the
Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity (CCUO). CCUO threatened to cut off funds for
the LSP component of CAP, the Legal Aid Bureau (LAB), if LAB would not cease its suits
against municipal agencies. See Pearson, supra note 46, at 646; Note, supra note 46, at 249-50
nn.59-61.
52 42 U.S.C. § 2812(c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
13 For example, United Fund's support of LSP's was withdrawn in St. Louis, Missouri,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma as a result of suits against local
government agencies that were heavy contributors to the United Fund. See Pearson,supra note
46, at 646; Note, supra note 46, at 259-60 n.95.
54 McKinsey & Co., Management Study of OEO.
55 See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 149-51.
56 Id. at 150-51. See also Robb, supra note 49, at 223.
57 SeeJUsTICE & REFORM 156-61; H.R. REP. No. 866, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1967).
58 See JUSTICE & REFORM 161-62.
11 The National Advisory Committee was established to enlist the support of the or-
ganized bar for federally funded legal services. Its members included, among others, officers
of the ABA, the National Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion (NLADA) and it acted as liaison between OEO and the bar. It functioned as "watchdog of
[Vol. 61:681
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tion on regionalization in the Fuchsberg Report, which recom-
mended raising LSP to independent status within the OEO, thus
freeing it from the administrative authority of CAP.60 The Nixon
administration took this step in 1969 and, additionally, made the
LSP Director an Associate Director of OEO.6 1 In announcing these
changes, former President Nixon stated:
The Office of Legal Services will.., be strengthened and elevated
so that it reports directly to the Director. It will take on central
responsibility for programs which help provide advocates for the
poor in their dealings with social institutions. The sluggishness of
institutions-at all levels of society-in responding to the needs of
individual citizens is one of the central problems of our time.
Disadvantaged persons in particular must be assisted so that they
fully understand the lawful means of making their needs known and
having those needs met. This goal will be better served by a separate
Legal Services Program, one which can test new approaches to this
important challenge.
62
The respite from the threat of regionalization was short-lived,
however. By early 1970, OEO had announced that a new form of
regionalization would be instituted, giving administration of LSP to
OEO's regional directors. The regional directors were all political
appointees; only two were lawyers.6 3 The National Advisory Com-
mittee and the organized bar quickly mobilized opposition in Con-
gress.64 By November 1970, OEO Director Rumsfeld had backed
away from regionalization but almost immediately issued an order to
decentralize the Legal Services Program.6 5 Decentralization entailed
giving operating responsibilities to regional lawyers and required
coordination of LSP activities with other anti-poverty programs.
the professionalism of the Program, protector of the independence of the Program within
OEO, fighter of political attempts to disrupt the Program's effectiveness, and ... advisor in
setting up an independent legal services program-a corporation." Haddad, The National
Advisoiy Committee to LegalServices, 30 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 198 (1972). See JUSTICE & REFORM
105-34. Once the National Advisory Committee had proposed establishment of a legal services
corporation in 1971, OEO began to bypass it. Howard Phillips finally abolished the National
Advisory Committee during his attempt to dismantle legal services in 1973. Although the
Senate version of the Legal Services Corporation bill proposed formation of a National
Advisory Council, the provision was not included in the final Act.
60 See Robb, supra note 49, at 223.
61 See id at 224-25.
62 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1135 (1969).
63 See Arnold, supra note 23, at 6; Robb, supra note 49, at 225.
64 See Robb, supra note 49, at 225-27; 116 CONG. Rc. 36,818-24 (1970) (remarks of
Senator Javits); Hearings on Legal Services Program of O.E.O. Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 140-69, 186-236, 239-330
(1970).
6 See Robb, supra note 49, at 227-28.
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Critics of decentralization argued that it was equivalent to re-
gionalization since it gave control of the program to non-lawyers.
66
The organized bar and congressional LSP supporters again voiced
opposition, and the decentralization scheme was therefore
scrapped.6 7 Meanwhile, however, the Director and Deputy Director
of LSP, both of whom opposed regionalization, were fired by OEO
Director Rumsfeld as the Administration sought to reassert political
control over the program.
68
Regionalization and decentralization struck at the very heart of
the LSP. Each plan would have subjected the professional indepen-
dence of legal services attorneys to political compromise, with legal
services becoming rherely another tool for dealing with local politi-
cians and bureaucrats. For instance, a CAP director would have
been expected to curb legal actions against local governments in
return for concessions favoring other poverty programs. But for the
poor, whose legal problems often stem from entanglements with
local bureaucracy, such a trade-off would have been devastating.
C. A Corporation for the LSP?
By early 1971, bruised by battles over regionalization and em-
barrassed by the reaction to its awkward handling of the CRLA
funding veto, the Administration began to consider seriously an
independent legal services corporation. An entity outside the execu-
tive branch would draw the fire provoked by legal services for the
poor and insulate the Administration itself from political attack. The
idea also appealed to legal services supporters, who saw it as a way to
preserve professional independence and insulate LSP from political
controversy.
The notion of a legal services corporation was not new, how-
ever. As early as 1968 the fundamental conflict between professional
independence and political pressure led to discussions between Earl
Johnson and the National Advisory Committee (NAC) concerning a
corporate home for LSP.6 9 As the tempo of attacks on legal services
increased, the consideration of how best to insulate the program
from political interference accelerated. By mid-1970 the ABA, the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), and the
NAC had all recommended moving LSP into an independent gov-
ernmental agency or else into a quasi-public corporation. Moreover,
66 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1970, at 23, col. 3.
67 See Robb, supra note 49, at 228 n.101.
68 See id.; Arnold, supra note 23, at 6-7.
69 See Robb, New Niche for National Legal Services, 57 A.B.A.J. 557, 558 (1971).
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the executive branch itself was considering a reorganization of legal
services. In June 1970, a study submitted to the Ash Council on
Executive Reorganization recommended that LSP be transferred to
the judiciary or to an independent agency.70 By early 1971, the Ash
Council recommended that legal services be placed in a nonprofit
corporation totally divorced from the executive branch. An impor-
tant component of this recommendation was the desire to eliminate
a political liability: "[T]his program should be placed in an organiza-
tional setting which will permit it to continue serving the legal needs
of the poor while avoiding the inevitable political embarrassment
that the program may occasionally generate."
'71
The American Bar Association, after a detailed consideration of
the alternatives, also recommended a private, nonprofit, federally-
funded corporate home for legal services. 72 The Departments of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and Justice were rejected as possible
locations-HEW and HUD because legal services lawyers often
brought suit against them, and the Department of Justice because it
represented HEW and HUD in such suits. The Administrative
Office of the Courts and the judiciary itself were rejected because
they were not equipped to deal with the political ramifications of
administering legal services. Similarly, an independent agency
within the executive branch was rejected because presidential ap-
pointment of directors was seen as compromising the political inde-
pendence essential to LSP.73 Perhaps most important, a successful
prototype of a private federally-funded nonprofit corporation
existed: the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).
74
The creation of CPB had been attended by a desire to provide
"the most insulation from Government control or influence over the
expenditure of funds.175 An independent corporation had been
created as the best way to accomplish that end. Nevertheless, the
ABA suggested some significant differences from the CPB model.
The President was authorized to appoint all directors of CPB, with
70 See id.
71 PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, ESTABLISHMENT OF A
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL RESOURCES-ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS
61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ASH COUNCIL]. See also Arnold, The Odyssey of Legal Services
and the Games Politicians Play, JuRis DOCTOR, Oct. 1974, at 25; Schardt, supra note 23, at 42.
12 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE CORPORATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY (1971) [here-
inafter cited as ABA STUDY].
13 ABA STUDY 22-33.
74 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1970).
7 H.R. REP. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
19761
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Senate confirmation. Because of the greater vulnerability of LSP to
political pressure, the ABA report suggested that the President
appoint only a portion of the new corporation's directors.7 6 Con-
cerned by the need of CPB to seek yearly appropriations, and the
inherent threat to independence that this funding mechanism pre-
sented, the ABA Report strongly urged that the legal services pro-
gram receive a permanent funding authorization of at least $90
million per year. 77 The National Advisory Committee, after a study
of the alternatives, similarly recommended that LSP be transferred
to a "District of Columbia non-profit corporation chartered by Con-
gress.
'78
Meanwhile, these recommendations were being shaped into
legislative proposals. In March 1971, a bipartisan bill sponsored by
Senator Mondale and Representatives Meeds and Steiger was in-
troduced in Congress. 7 9 The bill would have moved LSP into an
independent legal services corporation, permitted the President
to appoint only a minority of the directors, and authorized funding
for two years at levels significantly above those LSP had been receiv-
ing.
8 0
The Administration countered with its own bill in early May
1971.81 In submitting it to Congress, former President Nixon stated:
[I]f we are to preserve the strength of the [legal services] program,
we must make it immune to political pressures and make it a
permanent part of our system of justice.
The legal problems of the poor are of sufficient scope that we
should not restrict the right of their attorneys to bring any type of
civil suit. Only in this manner can we maintain the integrity of the
adversary process and fully protect the attorney-client relationship
so central to our judicial process.
82
To accomplish these ends, the administration bill proposed an
eleven person board appointed by the President, removed the gov-
11 ABA STUDY 43.
77 Ia. at 38-41, 51.
78 117 CONG. REC. 13,786-88 (1971) citing NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON THE LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM, RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED TRANSFER OF O.E.O. LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM.
71 S. 1305, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 6360, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
" Id. The bill required Congress to hold for the LSP $140 million of OEO's fiscal 1972
appropriation and $170 million of its fiscal 1973 appropriation.
81 H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). See 117 CONG. RIc. 13,788-90 (1971).
82 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 727, 729 (1971). The Legal Services Corporation Act,
however, restricts the right of legal services attorneys to bring a number of types of civil suits.
See text accompanying notes 174-76 infra.
[Vol. 61:681
1976] THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
ernors' veto power, 83 dropped the twenty percent local funding
requirement, and authorized funding for the corporation on a
three-year basis. 84 In addition, the administration bill authorized
funding of backup centers8 5 and suggested that solvent clients pay
some portion of their legal services costs.8 6 There were some restric-
tions on attorney activities that were nbt present in the bipartisan
bill. For example, lobbying, duplicative appeals, and grants to public
interest law firms were forbidden.
7
After much wrangling, Congress passed a compromise bill that
allowed the President to appoint only a portion of the directors of
the corporation.88 President Nixon vetoed the legislation because he
believed that this restriction was "an affront to the principle of
accountability to the American People as a whole." He concluded
that "[i]t would be better to have no legal services corporation than
one so irresponsibly structured."
89
In July 1972, after Congress had again voted for a corporation,
a revised provision was recommended by a House-Senate confer-
ence committee. 90 It continued the limitation on the President's
selection of the board, however, and because of the threat of an-
other veto, the bill containing the provision was recommitted to
conference. 91 When it emerged, the provision relating to a legal
services corporation had been dropped.9 2 The conference report
stated:
The conferees continue to strongly support the existing legal
services program and the concept of a legal services corporation
83 The bill did require that a state governor receive at least 30 days notice prior to the
Corporation's approval of any grant application made in the state. H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 905(f) (1971).
84 Id. § 908. No funding levels were specified, but President Nixon stated that "[t]he full
financial support of the government [for the LSP] is clearly needed." 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Docs. 729 (1971).
s H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 904(b)(5) (1971).
86 Id. § 905(a)(3).
87 H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). No waiver of the lobbying provision for the
representation of an eligible client was provided. Id. § 905(a)(6). Public interest law firms were
defined as those expending 75% of their time and resources litigating issues either in the
interests of the public or the poor. Id. § 905(b)(3).
88 S. 2007, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 904(a) (1971). See 117 CONG. REc. 31,248 (1971). Eleven
of the 17 proposed directors were to be selected by the President from lists submitted by the
Judicial Conference, a clients' advisory council, a project attorneys' advisory council and
five national professional associations, including the ABA and the NLADA.
89 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1635 (1971). See also 117 CONG. REC. 46,057 (1971). An
attempt in the Senate to override the President's veto was defeated. Id. at 46,222.
90 H.R. 12350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3193, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
91 See Schardt, supra note 23, at 43.
92 See 120 CONG. REC. S 1001 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
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and intend to continue to seek appropriate means of expanding
the program and insuring its independence, to provide the poor
greater access to our system of justice under law.
93
Unable to move LSP out of the executive branch on its own
terms, the Nixon administration stepped up the intensity of its
attacks on legal services. The legal services project in Camden, New
Jersey-Camden Regional Legal Services (CRLS)-had filed suit
against two urban renewal projects, alleging that the projects would
destroy much low-income housing without providing sufficiently for
relocation. Work on the projects halted as a result of the suit. The
Camden City Council contacted Vice President Agnew to enlist his
support against CRLS. 94 In a January 1972 speech, Agnew argued
that taxpayer-supported programs should not sue other taxpayer-
supported programs.95 In February 1972, Agnew met with the par-
ties to the Camden controversy. At the meeting he claimed that
Camden's mayor "has a greater right to claim that he represents
[CRLS] clients than [CRLS] because he earned that right at the
polls." 96 He urged CRLS to "be less militant in adhering to... the
total extent of [its client's] legal right in every instance. '97 In Sep-
tember 1972, Agnew delivered a sweeping indictment of LSP as
"tax-funded social activism [that] transfers great power in commu-
nity affairs from elected officials to self-appointed ones."98 He ar-
gued, ominously, that "the professional independence of the lawyer
necessarily conflicts ... with the requirements of a federally funded
social program that must be ... accountable to the public[,]" and
suggested that the conflict ought to be resolved by imposing "control
at the top."99
13 H.R. REP. No. 1367, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1972). The existing legal services program
was assured of continued funding through June 30, 1974, but only at a level of $71.5 million
for each fiscal year. 42 U.S.C. § 2702b(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
94 See Note, supra note 46, at 254-55 n.77.
95 See Haddad, supra note 59. at201. The parallels to the first Murphy amendment were
unmistakable. See text accompanying- hotes 27-28 supra.
9r See Note, supra note 46, at 264-55 n.77, quoting transcript of meeting in Vice-President
Agnew's office, Feb. 1, 1972.
97 Id.
98 Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 931-32 (1972).
99 Id. at 931. For an excellent reply to Agnew, see Klaus, Legal Services Program: Reply to
Vice President Agnew, 58 A.B.A.J. 1178 (1972). Klaus argued, correctly, that Agnew's sugges-
tion of "control at the top" totally disregarded the requirements of professional independence
set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
Interestingly, especially in light of the controversy that later erupted over law reform and
backup centers, Agnew urged that for attorneys in local projects, law reform should be a
by-product of their representation of eligible clients and that
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When early in 1973 President Nixon announced his intention to
dismantle OEO, 100 the attack on legal services entered a new phase.
The Administration's agent in this endeavor was Howard Phillips,
newly appointed Acting Director of OEO. As part of his mission,
Phillips took aim at LSP. In short order he placed limits on the
refunding of local programs, prepared a rationale for phasing out
backup centers, fired the LSP Director, struck down law reform as a
goal of legal services, and abolished the National Advisory Commit-
tee.' 0 ' He made the purely political thrust of his activities very clear:
[The Legal Services Program] has been run by lawyers who dis-
agree with the President's policies on welfare, on busing, on abor-
tion, on every major social issue, people who have concluded that
the only way to serve the poor is by opposing the policies of
Richard Nixon.... I ... reject ... any suggestion that they have
the prerogative to spend public funds in advancing their opposi-
tion.1
02
Although Phillips's public activities were soon enjoined, and his
appointment as Acting Director of OEO declared illegal,10 3 he con-
tinued to act behind the scenes to dismantle legal services. The
alternative he proposed was a revenue sharing approach to legal
services that would have abolished LSP in favor of turning funds for
legal services over to the states, which could then reject the funds if
they so decided. 0 4 Strong pressure on the Administration by the
[]aw reform as a specific goal should be the province of the national office and the
various backup centers. It should be pursued through responsible professional rep-
resentation before legislatures and governmental agencies and through amicus curiae
briefs or intervention in existing cases ....
Agnew, supra note 98, at 932.
100 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 86-98 (1973). See also Note, Legal Services-Past and
Present, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 960, 966 n.31 (1974).
19 See Arnold, The Knockdown, Drag-Out Battle Over Legal Services, JuRis DocTOR, April
1973, at 4.
102 Quoted in id. at 5. Phillips was also quoted as saying, "I think legal services is rotten and
it will be destroyed." 119 CONG. REc. 20,696 (1973).
103 See text accompanying note 237 infra.
104 See Arnold, supra note 71, at 25; Schardt, supra note 23, at 44. The revenue-sharing
proposal was embodied in S. 1990, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill, introduced by
Senator Helms, a vocal opponent of legal services and the Legal Services Corporation, would
have abolished OEO's legal services program (id. § 10(b)), created a Federal Legal Aid
Corporation to disburse funds to the states for legal services (id. §§ 4(a)-(b)), mandated the
creation of a Judicare system for delivering legal services (id. § 5(b)), and allowed the states to
refuse to participate in revenue sharing (id. § 5(d)). Interestingly, in light of Helms's later
position on backup centers, S. 1990 authorized the corporation to contract for legal research
on problems encountered by eligible clients. Id. § 4(b). The Helms bill was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, but was never considered by the Senate as such. 120 CONG. REc. S
12,134 (daily ed.,July 10, 1974). Thereafter, Helms introduced his revenue sharing scheme as
an amendment during the debates on the Senate's version of the Legal Services Corporation
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ABA blocked this proposal, however, and in May 1973 President
Nixon submitted a new legal services corporation bill to Congress.'05
It was not until over a year later that President Nixon signed
legislation establishing the Legal Services Corporation. Much of the
maneuvering involved in producing an act acceptable to both Houses
of Congress, and to the President, is described below in the context
of the backup center controversy. 10 6 The overall theme of this
struggle, however, was that after two years of unsuccessful efforts to
create a corporation, supporters of legal services, fearing another
veto and operating at times in a crisis atmosphere, were willing to
compromise where necessary to ensure the safety of the LSP.
The Administration's May 1973 proposal was similar to the
legislation it had offered in 1971. The proposal did not prohibit
grants to or contracts with backup centers. It proposed appointment
of an eleven person board by the President. State advisory coun-
cils, 10 7 corporation study of alternatives for delivering legal ser-
vices,10 8 and prohibition of grants to public interest law firms' 0 9
were new features of the proposal.
When the House Education and Labor Committee reported the
bill out, it had made one vital concession-the committee agreed
that the President should appoint all of the Corporation's directors.
Moreover, several important changes that became part of the final
legislation had been made. Lobbying activities were permitted if
necessary to represent an eligible client; the requirement that some
eligible clients pay fees was dropped; a more flexible standard for
eligibility was proposed; grants to some public interest law firms
were allowed; and a provision giving standing to "interested citi-
zens" in suits to enforce compliance with the legislation was de-
leted." 0 The Administration's agreement to these changes had been
obtained before the bill was reported out of committee."'
Nevertheless, by the time the committee bill was presented on
bill. 120 CONG. REc. S 979 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974). The scheme was rejected overwhelmingly.
Id. at S 992.
105 H.R. 7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 665 (1973).
106 See text accompanying notes 242-70 infra.
107 For the provision as ultimately enacted see note 156 infra.
108 See 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 665 (1973).
'09 See H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-29 (1973).
10 See id. Deletion of the standing provision was especially important in light of the
repeated attacks on the program by persons hostile to legal services. Such a provision might
have encouraged a rash of costly strike suits against the Corporation. During the House floor
debate on June 21, 1973, Representative Dennis attempted to reincorporate this provision,
but his proposed amendment was defeated by a substantial margin. See 119 CONG. REC.
20,725-29 (1973).
"I See Schardt, supra note 23, at 45-47.
[Vol. 61:681
1976] THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
the House floor for debate, administration support was waver-
ing."1 A barrage of restrictive floor amendments followed, twenty-
four of which were added to the bill. Significant amendments that
became part of the final legislation included limitations on funding
of backup centers,11 3 restrictions on off-duty nonpartisan political
activity of staff attorneys," 4 and prohibition of handling cases ded.-
ing with school desegregation," 15 nontherapeutic abortion," 6 and
the Selective Service."
7
The Senate proceeded more deliberately. Care was taken to
have the administration bill assigned to the sympathetic Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare." 8 After obtaining administration
support for the changes it wished to make, the committee reported
out its bill on November 9, 1973, in a form similar to the House bill.
After several debates, introduction of amendments from the floor,
and a filibuster, the Senate version of the bill was passed on January
31, 1974. Although the Senate accepted amendments restricting
class actions," 9 abortion suits, 120 and Selective Service litigation,12 it
rejected limitations on desegregation suits, 22 suits challenging state
legislation or a governor's veto of such legislation, 23 and suits
against federal programs. 24
"z See id. at 47.
See text accompanying notes 270-88 infra.
114 See 119 CONG. REC. 20,740-41 (1973). The provision is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). It was introduced by Representative Quie. The constitutional-
ity of the restriction on nonpartisan off-duty political activity is questioned in Note, Depoliticiz-
ing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REv.
734, 767-75 (1976).
'5 The amendment was introduced by Representative Mizell who focused, as had Rep-
resentative Green in introducing the backup center amendments, on the role of the Center for
Law and Education in the Detroit, Michigan, school desegregation case, Bradley v. Milliken,
345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). See 119 CONG. REc. 20,746-47 (1973). The provision is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974). The constitutionality of the restriction on
desegregation cases is questioned in Note, supra note 114 at 739-54.
"' The amendment was introduced by Representative Hogan and further amended by
Representative Froehlich. One purpose of Hogan's amendment was to "respond" to the
"shocking" Supreme Court decisions on abortion. 119 CONG. REc. 20,750-52 (1973). The
provision is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. IV, 1974). Its constitutionality is
questioned in Note, supra note 114, at 739-54.
"1 See 119 CONG. REC. 20,752 (1973) (remarks of Representative Waggoner). The provi-
sion is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(9) (Supp. IV, 1974). One other amendment, intro-
duced by Representative Hays and accepted by the House, provided that "[n]o assistance shall
be given to indigent, abandoned Watergate defendants." 119 CONG. REC. 20,754 (1973).
118 See Schardt, supra note 23, at 48.
119 See 120 CONG. REC. S 916-17 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
120 See id. at S 824-25 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974).
121 See id. at S 965 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
122 See id. at S 928, S 964.
123 See id. at S 972-73.
124 See id. at S 974, S 978-79. As Senator Long, who introduced the amendment, ex-
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When the bill finally emerged from conference in May 1974, it
was clear that important concessions had been made by both Houses
of Congress. In the most significant compromises, the Senate ac-
cepted House restrictions on off-duty nonpartisan political activity
and desegregation cases, while the House retreated from its restric-
tions on backup center funding.' 25 The conference bill was ac-
cepted by both Houses, but to avoid a veto, the backup center
restrictions were later restored. 126 On July 25, 1974, the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation Act was signed into law. 127
D. The Fight Continues
The Act was designed to move the embattled Legal Services
Program from the executive branch to an independent corpora-
tion, thereby insulating it from political interference. Unfortu-
nately, signing of the Act merely triggered a new wave of political
fighting which lasted almost an entire year. Before LSP could be
transferred to the Corporation, the Act required that a board of
directors be appointed. 28 The first group of nominees provoked a
storm of reaction from the organized bar and legal services support-
ers.129 Most of the protest was directed at three nominees: two were
characterized as critics of legal services, 30 and one was known only
as a conservative ex-presidential campaign director.' 31 Two of these
nominees withdrew under fire. The last, William Knecht, whose
nomination was sponsored by Ronald Reagan, 132 did not receive
approval from the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
which examined the nominees' credentials.133 Finally on July 9,
1975, with only four of the original eleven nominees surviving, the
Senate confirmed a board of directors for the new Corporation.
34
plained: "It involves the proposition that no one but an idiot would hire a lawyer to sue
himself." Id. aCS 974.
125 See 120 CONG. REc. H 3952-53 (daily ed. May 16, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Quie); H.R. REP. No. 1039, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
'12 See text accompanying notes 266-70 infra.
127 Act of July 25, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2996-961 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
128 Id. § 3(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996b nt. (Supp. IV, 1974).
129 See Arnold, supra note 42, at 32; Osborne, White House Watch: Containing Poverty,
NEW REPUBLic, Feb. 15, 1975, at 15-18.
130 One nominee, Edith Green, was author of the so-called Green Amendment restricting
backup center activities. The other, William Knecht, criticized the idea of a corporation for
legal services and was a vocal opponent of California Rural Legal Assistance.
"I Denison Kitchell of Arizona managed Senator Goldwater's 1964 campaign for the
Presidency.
132 See Arnold, supra note 42, at 37.
133 See id.
... See 121 CONG. REc. S 12,206 (daily ed. July 9, 1975).
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On July 14, 1975, the directors were sworn in and promptly held
their first meeting.
Ironically, the loser in this drawn-out political battle was the
Legal Services Program, which the Act was supposed to protect.
Congress, believing that creation of a corporate haven for the pro-
gram was imminent, had funded legal services under continuing
resolutions at $71.5 million per year during the four-year fight to
establish the Corporation. Fixed funding for this extended pe-
riod-one marked by high inflation and increasing unemploy-
ment-reduced the quantity of service available to the poor,
threatened its quality, and produced an unacceptable level of lawyer
turnover.
1 3 5
The number of legal services lawyers in the field has dropped
by about thirteen percent since 1972, and the number of neighbor-
hood law offices by more than forty percent. During the same
period economic recession has increased the eligible client popula-
tion and generated a higher demand for services.' 36 One predictable
result has been service cutbacks. Some programs have stopped tak-
ing clients for periods of two months or more, while others have
turned away categories of cases, such as bankruptcies and divorces.
Working conditions in some programs-lack of privacy for client
interviews or insufficient funds for essential activity such as
discovery-have failed to meet requirements of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.' 3 7 Another predictable result-the widening
gap between salaries of legal services lawyers and lawyers employed
elsewhere-has led to attorney turnover approaching forty percent
per year. Obviously, the program cannot withstand a talent loss of
this magnitude without suffering grave harm.' 38
One of the first acts of the new board of directors was therefore
to request a $96.5 million appropriation for fiscal year 1976. Con-
gress appropriated $88 million, $16.5 million more than the pro-
gram had received during each of the previous four years, but $8.5
million less than the board believes is essential. 3 9 These funds can
only begin to restore the program's operating capacity and staff
morale.
"13 See Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 9 (Legal Services Corporation), at 18-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Legal Services
Appropriation Hearings]. See also Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339,
1340-41 (1975).
'3 See Cramton, supra note 135, at 1340.
1 See id.; Legal Services Appropriation Hearings 18-21.
138 See Legal Services Appropriation Hearings 19.
139 See Cramton, supra note 135, at 1341.
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II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION ACT OF 1974
The focus of the Legal Services Corporation Act is three-fold:
access, professionalism, and freedom from political interference.
First, access to the system of justice for those otherwise unable to
afford adequate legal counsel is recognized.1 40 Second, high quality
legal assistance through the existing Legal Services Program is
affirmed. 41 Third, as befits the Act's tortured legislative history, the




Eligibility for legal services is the most significant measure of
access. The Act defines an eligible client broadly to be "any person
financially unable to afford legal assistance.' 1 43 The Corporation is
authorized to establish flexible guidelines that take into account such
factors as family size, income and debt levels, urban and rural
differences, and cost of living variations. The Corporation is to
establish priorities giving preference to the "poorest of the poor" in
the provision of service. 144 Moreover, where significant numbers of
140 "[Tlhere is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for
individuals who seek redress of grievances ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
I41 "[T]here is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be
otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel and to continue the present vital legal
services program ...."Id. § 2996(2).
142 "[T]o preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the
influence of or use by it of political pressures; and ... attorneys providing legal assistance must
have full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profes-
sion." Id. §§ 2996(5)-(6).
143 Id. § 2996a(3).
144 With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the Corporation shall-...
(A) establish, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget and with the Governors of the several States, maximum income levels (taking
into-account family size, urban and rural differences, and substantial cost-of-living
variations) for individuals eligible for legal assistance under this subchapter;
(B) establish guidelines to insure that eligibility of clients will be determined by
recipients on the basis of factors which include-
(i) the liquid assets and income level of the client,
(ii) the fixed debts, medical expenses, and other factors which affect the client's
ability to pay,
(iii) the cost of living in the locality, and
(iv) such other factors as relate to financial inability to afford legal assistance,
which shall include evidence of a prior determination, which shall be a disqualifying
factor, that such individual's lack of income results from refusal or unwillingness,
without good cause, to seek or accept an employment situation; and
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eligible clients do not speak English, the Corporation is to provide
assistance in their language. 145 Other practices that enhance access
to legal services include placing eligible clients on governing bodies
of grant recipients146 and applying the Freedom of Information Act
to the Corporation.147 Furthermore, the Corporation is charged




The Act explicitly states that legal services attorneys are to
provide the most effective representation for their clients, consistent
with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 49 For example, the
(C) establish priorities to insure that persons least able to afford legal assistance
are given preference in the furnish'ing of such assistance ....
Id. § 2996f(a)(2). See H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973). A final determination
of refusal to work, without good cause, is a disqualifying factor, but otherwise eligible clients
can be represented by legal services attorneys in challenging the correctness of such a determi-
nation. See 120 CONG. REC. S 12,950 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Mondale);
id. at S 12,953-54 (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
145 "In areas where significant numbers of eligible clients speak a language other than
English as their principal language, the Corporation shall, to the extent feasible, provide that
their principal language is used in the provision of legal assistance to such clients under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
146 In making grants or entering into contracts for legal assistance, the Corpora-
tion shall insure that any recipient organized solely for the purpose of providing legal
assistance to eligible clients is governed by a body at least 60 percent of which consists
of attorneys who are members of the bar of a State in which the legal assistance is to
be provided (except that the Corporation (1) shall, upon application, grant waivers to
permit a legal services program, supported under section 2809(a)(3) of this title,
which on July 25, 1974, has a majority of persons who are not attorneys on its
policy-making board to continue such a non-attorney majority under the provisions
of this subchapter, and (2) may grant, pursuant to regulations issued by the Corpora-
tion, such a waiver for recipients which, because of the nature of the population they
serve, are unable to comply with such requirement) and which include at least one
individual eligible to receive legal assistance under this subchapter. Any such attor-
ney, while serving on such board, shall not receive compensation from a recipient.
Id. § 2996f(c).
147 Id. § 2996d(g). The Corporation has issued Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (Supp. IV, 1974), regulations. 40 Fed. Reg. 42,362 (1975).
148 The Corporation shall provide for comprehensive, independent study of the
existing staff-attorney program under this chapter and, through the use of appropri-
ate demonstration projects, of alternative and supplemental methods of delivery of
legal services to eligible clients, includingjudicare, vouchers, prepaid legal insurance,
and contracts with law firms; and, based upon the results of such study, shall make
recommendations to the President and the Congress, not later than two years after
the first meeting of the Board, concerning improvements, changes, or alternative
methods for the economical and effective delivery of such services.
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g) (Supp. IV, 1974). The study of alternative delivery systems is discussed in
notes 315-32 and accompanying text infra.
149 The Corporation shall not, under any provision of this subchapter, interfere
with any attorney in carrying out his professional responsibilities to his client as
established in the Canons of Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
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Act requires the Corporation to ensure that local projects maintain
"the highest quality of service and professional standards, the pres-
ervation of attorney-client relationships, and the protection of the
integrity of the adversary process from any impairment in furnish-
ing legal assistance to [such] clients .... '150 The maintenance and
improvement of professional standards are further assured by train-
ing programs designed to prepare attorneys and paralegals to pro-
vide quality assistance.' 51 Additionally, the Act requires evaluations
of local programs, 52 and study of delivery systems to determine
ways in which the program can be improved.'
53
The Act settles one question raised by the regionalization
fight-the Corporation is to be managed and directed by profes-
sionals. A majority of the directors must be lawyers, 54 sixty percent
of the body governing a local project must be lawyers,'155 and a
majority of members of state advisory councils must be lawyers.
156
American Bar Association (referred to collectively in this subchapter as "professional
responsibilities") or abrogate as to attorneys in programs assisted under this subchap-
ter the authority of a State or other jurisdiction to enforce the standards of profes-
sional responsibility generally applicable to attorneys in such jurisdiction. The Cor-
poration shall ensure that activities under this subchapter are carried out in a manner
consistent with attorneys' professional responsibilities.
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
1o Id. § 2996f(a)(1).
'5' Such training is limited by the Act as follows:
No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either
by grant or contract, may be used-. . . to support... training programs for the
purpose of advocating particular public policies or encouraging political activities,
labor or antilabor activities, boycotts, picketing, strikes, and demonstrations, as dis-
tinguished from the dissemination of information about such policies or activities,
except that this provision shall not be construed to prohibit the training of attorneys
or paralegal personnel necessary to prepare them to provide adequate legal assis-
tance to eligible clients ....
Id. § 2996f(b)(5). See also id. §§ 2996e(b)(4), 2996f(a)(4).
352 The Corporation shall monitor and evaluate and provide for independent
evaluations of programs supported in whole or in part under this subchapter to
insure that the provisions of this subchapter and the bylaws of the Corporation and
applicable rules, regulations, and guidelines promulgated pursuant to this subchap-
ter are carried out.
Id. § 2996f(d).
'53 Id. § 2996f(g), reproduced in note 148 supra.
154 The Corporation shall have a Board of Directors consisting of eleven voting
members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, no more than six of whom shall be of the same political party. A majority shall
be members of the bar of the highest court of any State, and none shall be a full-time
employee of the United States.
Id. § 2996c(a).
Is- Id. § 2996f(c), reproduced in note 146 supra.
156 Within six months after the first meeting of the Board, the Board shall
request the Governor of each State to appoint a nine-member advisory council for
such State. A majority of the members of the advisory council shall be appointed,
after recommendations have been received from the State bar association, from
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Nevertheless, there are other provisions in the Act that restrict the
discretion of legal services lawyers in serving the best interests of
their clients. Such provisions, however, may be construed to do no
more than reiterate certain mandates of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recognize the limited resources of the program.
For example, the Act requires staff attorneys to obtain the approval
of project directors before instituting class actions. 157 Local projects
are to review appeals to ensure that project resources are not wasted
in useless appeals.'- 8 Moreover, legal assistance attorneys must re-
frain from inciting litigation and other activity that violates the Code
of Professional Responsibility.'
59
C. Freedom from Political Interference
The Act attempts to separate politics from legal services in two
respects. To avoid the governmental interference that accompanied
among the attorneys admitted to practice in the State, and the membership of the
council shall be subject to annual reappointment. If ninety days have elapsed without
such an advisory council appointed by the Governor, the Board is authorized to
appoint such a council. The advisory council shall be charged with notifying the
Corporation of any apparent violation of the provisions of this subchapter and
applicable rules, regulations, and guidelines promulgated pursuant to this subchap-
ter. The advisory council shall, at the same time, furnish a copy of the notification to
any recipient affected thereby, and the Corporation shall allow such recipient a
reasonable time (but in no case less than thirty days) to reply to any allegation
contained in the notification.
Id. § 2996c(t).
157 No class action suit, class action appeal, or amicus curiae class action may be
undertaken, directly or through others, by a staff attorney, except with the express
approval of a project director of a recipient in accordance with policies established by
the governing body of such recipient.
Id. § 2996e(d)(5). This provision does not necessarily conflict with the requirement that clients
receive the best possible representation. It should mean that a senior attorney must screen
class actions for utility before instigation.
158. With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the corporation shall-... require
recipients to establish guidelines, consistent with regulations promulgated by the
Corporation, for a system for review of appeals to insure the efficient utilization of
resources and to avoid frivolous appeals (except that such guidelines or regulations
shall in no way interfere with attorneys' professional responsibilities) ....
Id. § 2996f(a)(7).
159 With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the Corporation shall- . . insure
that all attorneys, while engaged in legal assistance activities supported in whole or in
part by the Corporation, refrain from the persistent incitement of litigation and any
other activity prohibited by the Canons of Ethics and Code of Professional Responsi-
bility of the American Bar Association; and insure that such attorneys refrain from
personal representation for a private fee in any cases in which they were involved
while engaged in such legal assistance activities.
Id. § 2996f(a)(10). See also id. § 2996e(f), which allows a successful defendant to recover costs
and fees in an action brought by a local project if a court finds either that the sole purpose for
which the action was brought was to harass the defendant or that the plaintiff "maliciously
abused legal process."
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prior legal services programs,'160 an independent entity is to operate
the new program. And fearing that the federally funded effort might
be used for political purposes other than providing legal services to
the needy, Congress has restricted the activities that legal services
attorneys may perform.
1. Insulation of the Corporation
The most significant organizational accomplishment of the new
Act is shifting the Legal Services Program to an independently char-
tered, private corporation. 16' The board of directors is composed
of eleven members, no more than six of whom may be members of
the same party.' 62 The board must appoint a lawyer as president of
the Corporation, and it may not use political criteria in making its
own personnel decisions. 1 63 Similarly, the Corporation may not use
these criteria in monitoring or selecting employees to deliver legal
services. 
164
As indicated above, 165 the Administration's delay in naming the
first board cost the program an increased appropriation for fiscal
year 1975, but it did obtain a substantial increase for fiscal year 1976.
Unfortunately, the entire program continues to be vulnerable to
political influence in funding matters. Without a minimum guaran-
teed appropriation, the Corporation must apply for funding annu-
ally.1 66 Although this is an important method of providing accoun-
"0 See generally text accompanying notes 13-68 supra.
161 There is established in the District of Columbia a private nonmembership
nonprofit corporation, which shall be known as the Legal Services Corporation, for
the purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal pro-
ceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
162 Id. § 2996c(a), reproduced in note 154 supra.
163 The Board named Thomas Ehrlich, the widely respected Dean of the Stanford Law
School, as theCorporation's first president. Ehrlich selected E. Clinton Bamberger,Jr., as his
executive vice president. Bamberger, first Director of the OEO Legal Services Program, had
played a vital role in the successful development of that program. See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra
note 7, at 67-149. Conservatives were outraged by the appointments, which they branded as
"radically oriented." Kilpatrick,Activism Feared in LegalServices Group, Syracuse Herald Ameri-
can, Nov. 16, 1975 (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review). Although they had professed
similar outrage when Nixon signed the Legal Service Corporation Act (see text accompanying
note 270 infra), the conservatives now argued that the selection of such "activists" would rob
them of their legislative "victory." Ford's BigBackdown on LegalServices, HUMAN EVENTS, Nov. 8,
1975, at 3-4.
64 In a related provision, the Corporation is prohibited from suspending financial
assistance unless it gives the recipient reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause why
there should be no suspension. Further, the Corporation cannot terminate assistance, or
continue a suspension for more than 30 days without giving the recipient "a timely, full, and
fair hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 2996j (Supp. IV, 1974). See also id. §§ 2996e(b)(1)-(2).
165 See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
166 There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out the
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tability, the Corporation will be crippled if legislators opposed to
federally-funded legal services succeed in denying the Corporation
adequate appropriations. Part of the problem is inherent. The Cor-
poration is admonished to deliver both economical and high quality
legal services, 167 but too great a stress on economy-which the Ford
administration has emphasized thus far168 -will again subject the
entire program to the ravages of inflation and make the Act's call for
equal access and high quality ring hollow.
2. Limitations on Activities
There are two categories of restrictions on the activities of the
Legal Services Corporation: those that limit what the Corporation
itself may do, and those that limit what recipients169 and their
attorneys may do.
The Corporation must ensure that none of its employees or
employees of recipients providing legal assistance take part in or
encourage public demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, or strikes.
Such employees are further forbidden, at any time, to engage in or
encourage rioting, civil disturbance, violation of an outstanding
injunction, or intentional identification of the Corporation or recip-
ient with certain political activity. 170
activities of the Corporation, $90,000,000 for fiscal year 1975, $100,000,000 for fiscal
year 1976, and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1977. The first
appropriation may be made available to the Corporation at any time after six or more
members of the Board have been appointed and qualified. Appropriations shall be
for not more than two fiscal years, and, if for more than one year, shall be paid to the
Corporation in annual installments at the beginning of each fiscal year in such
amounts as may be specified in appropriation Acts.
42 U.S.C. § 2996i(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
167 With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the Corporation shall-.., insure
that grants and contracts are made so as to provide the most economical and effective
delivery of legal assistance to persons in both urban and rural areas ....
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also id. § 2996(2) (mandating the provision of
high quality legal assistance), reproduced in note 141 supra.
16 The Corporation requested an appropriation of over $140 million for fiscal year
1977. Early indications from the Administration were that only $80 million would be recom-
mended for the Corporation, an amount less than that appropriated for fiscal year 1976.
169 "Recipient" means "any grantee, contractee, or recipient of financial assistance" for
the purpose of providing legal assistance under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2996a(6) (Supp. IV,
1974).
170 The Corporation shall insure that (A) no employee of the Corporation or of
any recipient (except as permitted by law in connection with such employee's own
employment situation), while carrying out legal assistance activities under this sub-
chapter, engage in, or encourage others to engage in, any public demonstration or
picketing, boycott, or strike; and (B) no such employee shall, at any time, engage in,
or encourage others to engage in, any of the following activities; (i) any rioting or civil
disturbance, (ii) any activity which is in violation of an outstanding injunction of any
court of competent jurisdiction, (iii) any other illegal activity, or (iv) any intentional
identification of the Corporation or any recipient with any political activity prohibited
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The Corporation may not lobby for or against any federal, state,
or local legislation unless it has been formally requested to do so or
unless its own activities are involved. 17 ' Neither the Corporation nor
its recipients may make political contributions or contributions relat-
ing to the passage of ballot measures, initiatives, or referendums.
However, recipients may advise and represent clients regarding
such matters.'
72
With certain exceptions, recipients and their attorneys are for-
bidden to lobby at any level of government. 17 3 While on duty, all legal
by section 2996f(a)(6) of this title. The Board within ninety days after its first
meeting, shall issue rules and regulations to provide for the enforcement of this
paragraph and section 2996f(a)(5) of this title, which rules shall include, among
available remedies, provisions, in accordance with the types of procedures prescribed
in the provisions of section 2996j of this title, for suspension of legal assistance
supported under this subchapter, suspension of an employee of the Corporation or
of any employee of any recipient by such recipient, and, after consideration of other
remedial measures and after a hearing in accordance with section 2996j of this title,
the termination of such assistance or employment, as deemed appropriate for the
violation in question.
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also id § 2996e(e)(1). The prohibited political
activity is set forth in § 2996f(a)(6). Section 2996e(b)(5) further required the board to adopt
regulations for enforcement of the section within 90 days of its first meeting. See Fed. Reg.
33,293 (1975). The constitutionality of these regulations, which merely track the statute, has
been challenged in Welfare Rights Org. v. Cramton, Civil No. 75-1938 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20,
1975). The Corporation or recipient employees, however, may engage in picketing and related
activity if it relates to their own employment situation. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5) (Supp. IV,
1974).
171 The'Corporation shall not itself-.., undertake to influence the passage or
defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States or by any State or local
legislative bodies, except that personnel of the Corporation may testify or make other
appropriate communication (A) when formally requested to do so by a legislative
body, a committee, or a member thereof, or (B) in connection with legislation or
appropriations directly affecting the activities of the Corporation.
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(c)(2)(Supp. IV, 1974).
172 Neither the Corporation nor any recipient shall contribute or make available
corporate funds or program personnel or equipment for use in advocating or
opposing any ballot measures, initiatives, or referendums. However, an attorney may
provide legal advice and representation as an attorney to any eligible client with
respect to such client's legal rights.
Id. § 2996e(d)(4).
173 With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the Corporation shall- . . .
insure that no funds made available to recipients by the Corporation shall be used at
any time, directly or indirectly, to influence the issuance, amendment, or revocation
of any executive order or similar promulgation by any Federal, State, or local agency,
or to undertake to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress
of the United States, or by any State or local legislative bodies, except where-
(A) representation by an attorney as an attorney for any eligible client is neces-
sary to the provision of legal advice and representation with respect to such client's
legal rights and responsibilities (which shall not be construed to permit a recipient or
an attorney to solicit a client for the purpose of making such representation possible,
or to solicit a group with respect to matters of general concern to a broad class of
persons as distinguished from acting on behalf of any particular client); or
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assistance attorneys must refrain from political activity such as voter
registration and transportation, although they may provide legal
advice to eligible clients on such matters. In addition, staff
attorneys-those who receive more than one-half of their profes-
sional income from recipients' 74 -must refrain from specified off-
duty political activities, whether partisan or nonpartisan. 75 More-
over, certain organizing activities are forbidden, except in the
course of providing legal assistance to eligible clients.1
7 6
The foregoing limitations on attorney activities raise serious
constitutional issues.' 7 7 Still more troublesome are the issues raised
by restrictions on the kinds of cases recipients and attorneys may
handle.'7 8 Congress decided to placate opponents of certain con-
troversial legal developments, e.g., nontherapeutic abortion and
school desegregation, by forbidding legal services to handle such
cases. This wrong-headed approach to depoliticizing legal services
demonstrates a grave misunderstanding of the legal process. Ac-
cording to the Act, legal services attorneys may not represent clients
in actions involving collateral attack on criminal convictions,'
79
(B) a governmental agency, a legislative body, a committee, or a member thereof
requests personnel of any recipient to make representations thereto ....
Id. § 2996f(a)(5).
174 Id. § 2996a(7).
175 With respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal
assistance to eligible clients under this subchapter, the Corporation shall-.., insure
that all attorneys engaged in legal assistance activities supported in whole or in part
by the Corporation refrain, while so engaged, from-
(A) any political activity, or
(B) any activity to provide voters or prospective voters with transportation to the
polls or provide similar assistance in connection with an election (other than legal
advice and representation), or
(C) any voter registration activity (other than legal advice and representation);
and insure that staff attorneys refrain at any time during the period for which they
receive compensation under this subchapter from the activities described in clauses
(B) and (C) of this paragraph and from political activities of the type prohibited by
section 1502(a) of Title 5, whether partisan or nonpartisan ....
Id. § 2996f(a)(6) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974)).
176 No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used-.., to organize, to assist to organize, or to encourage
to organize, or to plan for the creation or formation of, or the structuring of, any
organization, association, coalition, alliance, federation, confederation, or any similar
entity, except for the provision of legal assistance to eligible clients in accordance with
guidelines promulgated by the Corporation ....
Id. § 2996f(b)(6).
177 See Note, supra note 114, at 760-75.
178 See id. at 739-54.
179 No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used- . . . to provide legal assistance with respect to any
fee-generating case (except in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the Cor-
poration), to provide legal assistance with respect to any criminal proceeding, or to
provide legal assistance in civil actions to persons who have been convicted of a
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juveniles in certain circumstances, 18 0 desegregation of elementary or
secondary schools,' 8 ' nontherapeutic abortion, 82 Selective Service
violations, or desertion.' 8 3 No rational classification is made by the
desegregation and abortion limitations. Congressional hostility to
legal services, rather than sound legislative principles, led to these
restrictions, and their constitutionality should therefore be chal-
lenged as soon as possible.'
84
D. Other Provisions
The issue of the funding veto by state governors1 8 5 has been
resolved in the Act. Governors must be notified thirty days before a
grant is made in their state, but they have no power to veto such
grants.' 8 6 State advisory councils must be established, but their sole
criminal charge where the civil action arises out of alleged acts or failures to act and
the action is brought against an officer of the court or against a law enforcement
official for the purpose of challenging the validity of the criminal conviction ....
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Indians charged with misdemeanor offenses in tribal
courts may be represented. See H.R. REP. No. 1039, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974). Represen-
tation of prisoners in suits seeking relief other than overturning their convictions is permitted
by implication.
ISO No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used-.., to provide legal assistance under this subchapter
to any unemancipated person of less than eighteen years of age, except (A) with the
written request of one of such person's parents or guardians, (B) upon the request of
a court of competent jurisdiction, (C) in child abuse cases, custody proceedings,
persons in need of supervision (PINS) proceedings, or cases involving the initiation,
continuation, or conditions of institutionalization, or (D) where necessary for the
protection of such person for the purpose of securing, or preventing the loss of,
benefits, or securing, or preventing the loss or imposition of, services under law in
cases not involving the child's parent or guardian as a defendant or respondent ....
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
181 No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used- . . to provide legal assistance wtih respect to any
proceeding or litigation relating to the desegregation of any elementary or secondary
school or school system ....
Id. § 2996f(b)(7).
182 No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used- . . to provide legal assistance with respect to any
proceeding or litigation which seeks to procure a nontherapeutic abortion or to
compel any individual or institution to perform an abortion, or assist in the perfor-
mance of an abortion, or provide facilities for the performance of an abortion,
contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such individual or institu-
tion ....
Id. § 2996f(b)(8).
183 No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by
grant or contract, may be used- . . to provide legal assistance with respect to any
proceeding or litigation arising out of a violation of the Military Selective Service Act
or of desertion from the Armed Forces of the United States.
Id. § 2996f(b)(9).
184 See Note, supra note 114, at 739-54.
185 See notes 27-41 and accompanying text supra.
186 At least thirty days prior to the approval of any grant application or prior to
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function is to notify the Corporation of apparept violations of the
Act or regulations by recipients or attorneys.18 7 As discussed be-
low, 1 88 the Corporation itself must perform certain research, techni-
cal assistance, training, and clearinghouse activities,189 although it
may not participate in litigation on behalf of clients.' 90
III
BACKUP CENTERS
The development of specialized support centers to "backup"
project attorneys was vital to the success of LSP. This success often
provoked attack, however, and backup centers were widely attacked.
A political deal was therefore instigated, which resulted in a restric-
tive backup center provision in the Legal Services Corporation Act.
This limitation raises doubts about the status of backup centers and
thus threatens the ability of the entire program to provide high
quality legal assistance to as many poor clients as possible.
A. Pressures for the Development of Backup Centers
1. The Caseload Problem
The unmet need of the poor for legal assistance, and the early
success of LSP in expanding legal services, combined to bury local
projects under an avalanche of requests for help. 91 Project attor-
entering into a contract or prior to the initiation of any other project, the Corpora3
tion shall announce publicly, and shall notify the Governor and the State bar associa-
tion of any State where legal assistance will thereby be initiated, of such grant,
contract, or project. Notifications shall include a reasonable description of the grant
application or proposed contract or project and request comments and recommenda-
tions.
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(f) (Supp. IV, 1974).
157 Id. § 2996c(O, reproduced in note 156 supra.
188 See notes 281-82 and accompanying text infra.
189 To the extent consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, the Corpora-
tion shall exercise the powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by the District
of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act (except for section 1005(o) of title 29 of the
District of Columbia Code). In addition, the Corporation is authorized- . . to
undertake directly and not by grant or contract, the following activities relating to the
delivery of legal assistance-
(A) research
(B) training and technical assistance, and
(C) to serve as a clearinghouse for information.
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
110 The Corporation shall not itself-participate in litigation on behalf of clients
other than the Corporation ....
Id. § 2996e(c)(1).
191 See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 127; Vanaman, Book Review, 10 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 772 (1975).
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neys discovered that the legal problems of the poor are numerous,
complex, and time consuming. 192 Legal services attorneys who had
practiced privately estimated that it takes almost five times as much
time and effort to provide adequate representation to poor clients as
it takes to provide similar representation in private practice.
193
Moreover, the limited resources of LSP' 94 made it impossible for
project attorneys to assist every client who walked through the door.
Attempts to represent too many clients meant that all received
short shrift: few depositions could be taken, few interrogatories
could be filed, and few appeals could be made. 95 In consumer
contract cases, for example, project attorneys used telephone
negotiations with creditors to reduce their clients' payments, but
they could not pursue such potential abuses as fraud and usury.'
96
Attorneys also accepted clients' simplistic characterizations of legal
problems, servicing only the problems described, rather than ferret-
ing out the operative facts. Thus, legitimate defenses were not raised
and cross-claims were not made.'1
9
This caseload pressure threatened to undermine the quality of
service provided to the poor, 198 and the lawyer's ethical responsibil-
ity to provide, at a minimum, adequate professional service to his
client.' 99 Thus, projects were forced to limit their caseloads in a
variety of ways. One method was simply to close project doors when
there was a case overload.200 A far less arbitrary device, however,
developed from the realization that legal problems often involve
issues common to an entire economic class. The poor share a com-
mon interest in governmental practices, policies, programs, and laws
having an impact on their well-being. 20' Selecting cases likely to have
192 See Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor. Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 J. URBAN L. 217, 218 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Silver]. Ms. Silver is a former
Director of the Berkeley Neighborhood Legal Services Project.
' See Silver 220. The multiplicity of cases for which each client needed help, communi-
cation difficulties, unfamiliarity with such concepts as contract or liability, distrust, and failure
to understand the notion of lawyer-client confidentiality helped account for this disparity. Id.
at 218-21. See also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 4-5.
194 A total of $291 million was appropriated in the first seven fiscal years of the program.
JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 369 n. 234.
195 See Silver 226, quoting Address by Gary Bellow, Harvard Sesquicentennial Celebra-
tion, Sept. 23, 1967.
198 See Silver 244-45.
197 See id. at 231.
198 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 6, 21-22; Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal
Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805, 822-28 (1967).
199 See Canons 1, 6 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
209 See Silver 233-34.
201 Legal problems of the poor were common on a nationwide basis as well. For example,
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wide impact thus became a method of caseload limitation. It assured
the most efficient allocation of resources, and was a method that
poor clients themselves could support. When asked to select a
method of case load limitation, project advisory councils composed
of poor people agreed that selecting cases affecting the largest
groups of poor people was the best method.
20 2
The national "group interest" of the poor, the need to limit
caseloads, and the overriding need to make efficient use of limited
funds were pressures leading to the development of a national
network of backup centers to expand the capacity of local projects.
2. Staffing Patterns
Another significant pressure leading to a national support sys-
tem was the staffing pattern of legal services projects. The typical
staff attorney lacked experience in the area of poverty law.
20 3
Moreover, heavy case burdens, low salaries, and the frustrations of
poverty law practice contributed to attorney "burn-out" and high
turnover. 20 4 Staff attorneys often did not spend enough time in
poverty law practice to develop expertise in handling the
complex tangle of federal and state statutes and regulations. Poverty
law and poverty law programs were new and rapidly changing;
merely keeping abreast of the burgeoning law was virtually a full-
time occupation.
Although local projects needed to train their attorneys and give
them an education in substantive poverty law, neither projects nor
attorneys had time to pursue these endeavors. Even when staff
attorneys could find the time, many projects lacked adequate li-
braries. Moreover, in many areas of the law adequate research tools
were simply unavailable.
Development of sufficient expertise within each legal services
project was not the answer, for it would have required intense
concentration on every case and would have forced dramatic cut-
backs in the caseload-something LSP could ill-afford. Moreover,
this would have wasted scarce resources, for local expertise would
have been unavailable to other projects. These factors eventually led
to the development of a rational, efficient mechanism for dealing
many states had enacted welfare residency requirements and man-in-the-house restrictions.
See JuSTIcE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 181. Thus many similar problems affected the poor
regardless of the state in which they lived.
202 See Silver 241-42. See also Falk & Pollak, supra note 37, at 1289.
203 Memorandum from C. Eardley to L. Oberdorfer, Sept. 7, 1975 (copy on file at the
Cornell Law Review).
204 Legal Services Appropriation Hearings, supra note 135, at 19.
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with recurring legal problems on a state and national basis-backup
centers. These backup centers supplied the expertise in poverty law
practice that local projects simply could not afford to develop. 20 5
B. Development of Backup Centers
A prototype of a national backup center existed at the time LSP
was created. The Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law at Co-
lumbia University20 6 had been established in early 1965 to help re-
form welfare law through litigation and legislative proposals.20 7 The
OEO took over funding of the center in 1966,08 and by 1967, using
less than one tenth of one percent of OEO's budget, the center had
been responsible for decisions striking down welfare residency and
man-in-the-house restrictions in several states.20 9 The impact of this
success, coupled with its low cost, led the legal services staff to create
twelve other national backup centers during the next few years,
concentrating on substantive law of significance to the poor.210 The
resulting national system of specialized legal services supplied the
continuity, professional experience, and expertise that local projects
often lacked. 211 Backup centers thus compensated for attorney turn-
over and caseload. They helped weld disparate local projects into a
cohesive national program concerned with providing the best possi-
ble representation to the poor.
Most of the centers have taken a multifunctional approach to
providing support services to local projects. For example, the Center
for Social Welfare Policy and Law has prepared training materials
and sessions, written briefs, drafted complaints, planned litigation,
assisted in discovery and oral argument, and developed manuals of
public assistance law. 212
205 Representative Chisholm summed up these pressures:
Those who worked within OEO to set up the [legal services] program, realized early
that the local legal services attorney was in vital need of backup assistance. Sometimes
this was because of inexperience but all too often it was because of the shortage of
resources and manpower necessary to keep current with legislative, administrative,
and case law developments relevant to the poor .... Backup assistance-such as
training of new attorneys, continuing legal education in new developing fields, and
specialized research on complex legal problems or the complex Federal programs so
vitally affecting the poor-was believed vital ....
120 CONG. REC. H. 6555 (daily ed. July 16, 1974).





211 See Weinstein, Waiting for the End in California, Juous DocTOR, Oct. 1974, at 26
(attorneys at the National Housing Law Project in Berkeley have an average of seven years'
experience in their fields).
212 See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office--OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, 56 GEO.
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Other centers have a more narrow focus, but again give the
program a national direction and assist staff attorneys in local proj-
ects to practice high quality law for their clients. For example, the
National Clearinghouse for Legal Services publishes a monthly
journal on poverty law, the Clearinghouse Review, maintains and
distributes files of pleadings, opinions, and legislation, and prints
manuals and handbooks on poverty law topics.2 13 The Legal Ser-
vices Training Program at Catholic University's Columbus School of
Law provides national and regional training sessions for legal ser-
vices attorneys, emphasizing lawyering skills and substantive poverty
law topics. 214 The National Paralegal Institute performs a similar
function in paralegal training,215 and the NLADA's Management
Assistance Project provides consultation to local projects in program
management, with particular emphasis on caseload control mecha-
nisms.21 6
C. The Effectiveness of the National Program
Responding to specific requests for assistance has been the
primary role of the backup centers.21 7 The assistance provided has
been vital to LSP's efforts to expand the rights of the poor respect-
ing welfare,21 8 housing,2 1 9 and food stamps. 220 Success in cases such
as Goldberg v. Kelly, 22' Shapiro v. Thompson, 222 and King v. Smith, 223
L.J. 742, 757-58 (1968). Other backup centers have taken similar multifunctional approaches.
See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 9-13; NLADA, Outline of Support Center Functions and the
Corporation Act (undated) (copy on file at the CornellLaw Review) [hereinafter cited as Backup
Center Functions].
213 See Backup Center Functions 1.
214 See id. at 2.
215 See id. at 3.
216 See id. at 4.
217 During fiscal year 1974, 72% of backup center requests came from local projects and
13% came from eligible clients or client groups. NLADA, Legal Service Backup Centers:
Background Materials 13 nt. (Aug. 1975) (on file at the Cornell Law Review) [ hereinafter cited
as Background Materials].
218 See id. at 9-12; 120 CONG. REc. S 968-71 (daily ed.Jan. 31, 1974). For significant cases
see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
219 See, e.g, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 853 (1970); Edward v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1968).
220 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
221 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring evidentiary hearing before welfare benefits are termi-
nated as matter of procedural due process).
222 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating one year state residency requirement for welfare
eligibility as violative of equal protection).
223 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama substitute father regulation as inconsistent
with the Social Security Act).
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has been worth well over $1 billion to the poor.224 Using an admit-
tedly rudimentary but nonetheless conservative cost-effectiveness
analysis, Earl Johnson has calculated that the benefits to the poverty
community achieved in these and other cases outweigh the cost of
the legal services program "by a ratio of approximately 7 to 1,39225
and has called the centers "the key to economically productive advo-
cacy."
2 2 6
The success of the backup centers was not achieved without
other costs, however, because the entire legal services program be-
came embroiled in controversy. The congressional focus on backup
centers during debate on the Legal Services Corporation Act dem-
onstrated a failure to understand the attorney's role as advocate for
his clients' interests, and the backup centers' role in enabling an
overburdened, under-financed legal services program to provide
high quality legal assistance in an efficient manner.227
D. The Threat to Backup Centers
When Howard Phillips attempted to dismantle the Legal Services
Program,228 the backup centers became an immediate object of his
attention. Phillips believed that the centers were not helping local
projects with individual client representation and that they were
unaccountable to Congress. 229 He therefore instructed his staff to
explore methods of closing these centers, so as to curtail the law
reform efforts of the program.23 ° Marshall Boarman, OEO's acting
Director of Evaluation, commissioned special evaluations of the back-
up centers to prepare for their being closed. 23 ' The evaluations,
however, did not support abolition of the centers. Almost without
exception, the centers were found to be producing an excellent work
product in a responsible and professional manner.23 2 One evaluator,
Judge Sullivan of the Indiana Court of Appeals,
224 See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 232.
225 Id. at 230-34, 368-71 nn.229 & 236. Using the period fiscal year 1966 to fiscal year
1972,Johnson estimated that the legal services program cost about $290 million but obtained
benefits in excess of $2 billion for its clients. Johnson based his estimates of per case value on
government or other calculations of the level of increased benefits required to implement the
decisions involved.
226 See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 158.
227 See text accompanying note 259 infra; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 7-9.
22 See notes 100-05 and accompanying text supra.
229 See Arnold, supra note 101, at 6. See also Schardt, supra note 23, at 46.
230 See Arnold, supra note 101, at 4-6.
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went beyond the scope of the evaluation. . . to support the concept
of and need for such centers of specialization, citing their research
resources and expertise as a necessary supplement to the
neighborhood offices' operations under enormous time con-
straints and caseload pressures. Judge Sullivan referred to the [San
Francisco Youth Law Center's] "extremely worthwhile contribu-
tion" to the law and describe[d] the center's overall performance
as "the bargain of a lifetime.
'2 33
Nevertheless, some backup centers were put on month-to-
month funding. The acting Associate Director of LSP, J. Lawrence
McCarty, supplied a justification for abolishing the existing backup
centers in a memorandum to Phillips.2 34 He stated to his superior:
"If we were to wipe out the Backup Centers without explaining how
research was to be carried out we would look like we were killing
Legal Services. 2 35 McCarty then suggested the creation of a single
new backup center, to be managed by the directors of the antici-
pated Legal Services Corporation.236 Although Phillips was enjoined
from disbanding OEO prior to its legal date of expiration, which
ended this threat to the centers, 237 other attempts were made to
blunt their effectiveness.
In June 1973, OEO promulgated a regulation that struck down
law reform as a separate goal of the Legal Services Program. 3 8 This
change, the regulation noted, was "not intended to ban all resort by
attorneys to class actions, suits against the government, [or] test case
litigation."239 Such advocacy was permissible so long as it was
brought in response to a client's request and was fully understood by
the client. Nevertheless, the regulation demonstrated an obvious
intent to restrict the support function of backup centers.240 Phillips,
however, was forced out of OEO before it could be implemented.2 4a
233 See id.
234 Memorandum fromJ. Lawrence McCarty to Howard Phillips, Mar. 15, 1963 (copy on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
235 Id. at I.
236 Id. at 4. This is the solution to the backup center "problem" that Representative Green
pushed for as well. See text accompanying notes 246-49 infra.
237 Government Employees, Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 JF. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
Phillips rescinded those of his directives that he thought were -invalidated by the court's ruling.
38 Fed. Reg. 14,260 (1973).
238 45 C.F.R. § 1061.5-6 (1973) (suspended).
239 Id. § 1061.5-6(b).
240 Id. "Legal Services attorneys will not engage under any circumstances in non-client-
initiated advocacy; i.e., all advocacy must be solely in response to a client-initiated request for
legal help."
241 Interview with J. Lawrence McCarty, former Acting Associate Director of OLS, in
Washington, D.C., Dec. 12, 1975.
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This issue resurfaced when the House considered the Adminis-
tration's Legal Services Corporation bill.242 The section of the bill
relating to research, training, technical assistance, and clearinghouse
functions-all performed by backup centers-permitted the Corpo-
ration to undertake such functions "either directly or by grant or
contract."243 Thus, no change in the backup centers or their funding
was contemplated. The House Education and Labor Committee
reported the bill out with this provision intact,244 and a highly critical
minority report made no mention of the provision.2 45
During the legislative free-for-all that accompanied the House
debates on the bill, however, the backup centers were attacked.
Representative Edith Green offered an amendment allowing the
Corporation "to undertake directly and not by grant or contract" the
functions performed by backup centers.246 Her stated purpose was
"to stop the research and advocacy in the backup centers located
across the country,'"247 and "to get rid of the backup centers. 248 She
anticipated, however, that the kind of research she objected to
would be carried on by the Corporation itself.24 9 Critical Represen-
tatives complained that the centers had "become the cutting edge for
social change in this country, '250 and an "intellectual brain trust
which prepackages the lawsuits which go across the country. '2 5'
Moreover, allegations of improper activity were leveled at the cen-
ters, 25 2 and claims were made that they either were unnecessary, 25 3
or else gave poor clients an unfair advantage against opposing
parties.25 4
242 H.R. 7824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
243 Id. § 6(b) (emphasis added).
244 H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 17 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 20,715 (1973).
See also 120 CONG. REc. S 12,919 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
24 H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25-29 (1973).
2146 119 CONG. REc. 20,717 (1973) (emphasis added).
247 Id. at 20,721.
248 Id. at 20,721. "[The two amendments] . .. would require Corporation Lawyers to be
responsible for the kind of research they do and keep it in house." See also id. at 20,747.
249 Id. at 20,721, 20,748.
250 Id. at 20,717 (remarks of Representative Green).
21 Id. at 20,721 (remarks of Representative Conlan).
22 Howard Phillips helped engineer the congressional focus on backup centers and
supplied much of the information regarding alleged improprieties by the centers. See id. at
20,719 (remarks of Representative Conyers); Arnold, supra note 71, at 27. Many of the
charges proved to be inaccurate or untrue; those which were accurate dealt with activities that
were proper or, if improper, had been discontinued. See NLADA, Charges Against Backup
Centers (Aug. 1975) (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review); Schardt, supra note 23, at 49.
22. 119 CONG. REc. 20,719 (1973) (remarks of Representative G. Ford); id. at 20,721
(remarks of Representative Mazzoli: "[W]hen I was a practicing lawyer and struggling very
hard to make a living, I had no backup center. My backup center was my brain and my feet.").
24 Id. at 20,720 (remarks of Representative G. Ford). This position is hard to justify.
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The backup center debate demonstrated a failure to under-
stand the caseload problem of local offices, and the centers' crucial
role in enabling a national legal services program to provide effi-
dent legal representation. Nevertheless, the Green Amendment was
adopted by the House.
2 55
The backup center provision fared- better in the Senate. Work-
ing with the Administration's original bill, rather than the amended
House version, members of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare met with administration representatives, and in re-
turn for pledges of administration support, agreed to make some
changes in the bill. 256 No change, however, involved backup center
functions or funding. The bill was reported out with unanimous
committee backing. 257 Nevertheless, despite administration support
for quick passage, 258 the committee bill first encountered a filibuster
and then a series of delaying amendments.259 One such amendment,
introduced by Senator Helms, was designed to eliminate the entire
backup center concept.26 0 The Senate rejected this amendment and
passed its version of the legal services bill on January 31, 1974.261
The backup center provision was next considered in confer-
ence, where the House yielded on the issue, and the Senate and
administration provision was adopted. 262 When the House came to
vote on the conference report, however, Representative Ashbrook
moved to recommit the legal services bill to conference with instruc-
tions to restore the Green Amendment.263 But after this motion was
narrowly defeated,264 the House went on to accept the report by a
substantial margin.2 65 Thus, both Houses of Congress approved a
legal services corporation bill that would have continued the backup
centers without change.
The bill and the backup center provision, however, soon be-
Many legal services actions are brought against federal and state agencies, where the govern-
ment defense attorneys often have specialized support services as backup. Providing the same
support for legal services attorneys merely equalizes the resources available to poor clients.
I d. at 20,723. The vote was 245 in favor, 166 against.
256 See letter from Presidential Advisor Melvin Laird to Senator Nelson, Oct. 4, 1973,
quoted at 119 CONG. REc. 40,468 (1973); Schardt, supra note 23, at 48.
257 S. REP. No. 495, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973).
228 See letter from Melvin Laird, supra note 256.
259 See Schardt, supra note 23, at 48-49.
260 120 CONG. REc. S 967-68, 972 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974) (remarks of Senator Helms:
"The backup centers must be eliminated."). This proposal would not have allowed such
functions to be performed in-house by the Corporation either.
261120 CONG. REc. S 1012 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974).
262 H.R. RP. No. 1039, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
26 120 CONG. REc. H 3965 (daily ed. May 16, 1974).
264 Id. at H 3968-69. The vote was 183 in favor, 190 against.
262 Id. at H 3969. The vote was 227 in favor, 143 against.
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came the subject of "impeachment politics." President Nixon
threatened to veto the measure, apparently hoping to trade his
acquiescence for anti-impeachment votes. 266 The alternate price to
avoid a veto was restoration of the Green Amendment. The Senate
was so informed,267 and procedures were set in motion to reinstate
the Green Amendment.268 With the parliamentary maneuvering ac-
complished, both Houses passed the bill, 269 and former President
Nixon signed it into law on July 25, 1974.270
E. Impact of the Act on Backup Centers
Thus, a provision that had been rejected by both House and
Senate found its way back into the Act. One early congressional
response was to introduce legislation that in effect would repeal the
Green Amendment and allow the Corporation to continue funding
backup centers by grant or contract.271 This legislation has not been
passed, and even if it were to pass, it would almost certainly be
vetoed.272 For the time being, the Corporation must therefore ac-
cept the restrictions on backup centers.
It is still possible under the Act, however, to fund the specialized
litigation activities of backup centers, despite former Representative
Green's belief that her amendment would do away with backup
centers altogether. As discussed earlier, 273 the eleven backup centers
operate on a multifunctional basis. They directly provide specialized
litigation and other legal services to eligible clients. The backup
2 A See Arnold, supra note 71, at 27; Schardt, supra note 23, at 50.
267 120 CONG. REC. S 12,132 (daily ed. July 10, 1974); id, at S 12,631 (daily ed. July 16,
1974) (remarks of Senator Taft). See Arnold, supra note 71, at 27.
261 120 CONG. REC. S 12,132 (daily ed. July 10, 1974); id. at S 12,627 (daily ed. July 16,
1974); id. at H 6553.
269 Id. at H 6557 (daily ed. July 16, 1974); id. at S 12,957 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
270 Conservatives, who had been led to believe the bill, would be vetoed, were outraged.
Senator McClure of Idaho accused Nixon of playing impeachment politics by giving in to
liberal pressure. See Schardt, supra note 23, at 51. But conservatives later claimed passage of the
bill, with its restrictions on backup center funding, as a "legislative victory." See HUMAN
EVENTS, supra note 163, at 3.
271 See, e.g., H.R. 7005, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (authorizing the Corporation to fund
by grant or contract all backup center activities); H.R. 10799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(incorporating H.R. 7005, but limiting the Corporation's support of backup centers to 10% of
its annual appropriation). In the past, the backup centers have received no more than 7% of
the annual appropriations given the legal services program. For updated information on the
status of the Green Amendment and current efforts to continue funding of the backup centers
see Capowski, Introduction to the We!fare Law Issue, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 667-69 (1976).
272 As a Congressman, Gerald Ford supported the Green Amendment. 119 Cong. Rec.
20,720 (1973). See note 255 supra. Moreover, the conservative wing of the Republican Party
would insist on a veto, an insistence Ford might have to heed in an election year.
273 See text accompanying notes 212-16 supra.
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center provision does not on its face apply to such activities; it
merely forbids research, training, technical assistance, and clear-
inghouse functions.17 4 Moreover, other provisions of the Act au-
thorize and arguably require the Corporation to make available
specialized legal representation, whether by local projects or backup
centers.
2 75
The congressional debates on backup centers support this con-
clusion. Representative Hawkins, one of the House managers of the
bill, stated:
Our new legislation does not change the fact that the Corpo-
ration . . . cannot "participate in litigation on behalf of clients
other than the Corporation." All such litigation and other legal
assistance will be handled by local, State and National legal offices
which provide either general legal services or specialized legal
assistance. Thus, despite the unfortunate change in the confer-
ence bill, top notch legal services will continue to be provided to
the poor.
27 6
The Act and the pertinent legislative history thus require the Cor-
poration to continue funding programs providing specialized rep-
resentation to eligible clients, whether performed by backup centers
or not.
This conclusion, however, does not end the problem of inter-
preting section 2996e(a)(3), as modified by the Green Amend-
ment.277 The backup functions that section 2996e(a)(3) requires the
Corporation to undertake directly-research, training, technical as-
274 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). The text of the statute is reproduced in no.e
189 supra.
175 The Act requires the Corporation to "insure the maintenance of the highest quality of
[legal] service" (42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974); to "insure that grants and contracts
are made so as to provide the most economical and effective delivery of legal assistance to
persons in both urban and rural areas" (id. § 2996f(a)(3)); and "to make such ... grants and
contracts as are necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions" of the Act (id.
§ 2996e(a)(1)(B)). Most important, the Act prohibits the Corporation from "participat[ing]
in litigation on behalf of clients other than the Corporation." Id. § 2996e(c)(1).
276 120 CONG. REC. H 6555 (daily ed. July 16, 1974). Interestingly, Representative Edith
Green was apparently present during this discussion of specialized legal assistance but made
no comment. See also id. at H 6556 (remarks of Representative Steiger); id. at S 12,923 (daily
ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Nelson). In a letter dated Dec. 11, 1975, to Roger
Cramton, Board Chairman of the Legal Services Corporation, Representative Hawkins stated
his understanding of the compromise that restored the Green Amendment:
All advocacy services--be they in judicial, administrative or legislative forums-were
untouched by [the Green Amendment], particularly since those services may not be
provided by the Corporation directly. Thus national legal centers specializing on
particular subject matters could continue to provide advocacy functions in behalf of
clients on the local, state and national level.
(Copy on file at the Cornell Law Review.)
277 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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sistance, and clearinghouse activities-are nowhere defined in the
Act.2 78 Yet clearly the section does not mean that local projects,
necessarily funded by grant or contract, cannot engage in research
relating to the cases of their clients. That would be an absurd result,
inconsistent with the requirement that legal assistance attorneys
comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 279 The only
sensible interpretation is that the research restriction does not apply
where a client is directly involved. The legislative history fully sup-
ports such an interpretation.
28 0
At a minimum, however, section 2996e(a)(3) requires the Cor-
poration itself to assume the following functions: clearinghouse
2178 The statement in the original Conference Report, S. REP. No. 845, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1974), to the effect that "[t]he terms 'research' and 'research in connection with the
provision of legal assistance to eligible clients' are understood by the conferees to... [include]
the provision of co-counsel.. ." does not supply any assistance in defining the term research.
In the context of the version of the bill to which that statement made reference, it amounted to
an authorization to the Corporation to fund legal services programs to engage in co-counsel
work. But that version of the bill was not enacted. The enacted version allows the Corporation
to undertake research directly, but not by grant. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). If
research were defined in this context to include co-counsel activities involving litigation, it
would amount to an authorization to the Corporation to participate in litigation. This result
would be inconsistent with id. § 2996e(c)(1).
279 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(6), 2996e(b)(3), 2996f(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Disciplinary
Rule 6-101 (A)(2) of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry requires that "[a lawyer
not] handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances." Moreover,
§ 2996e(a)(3) does not prevent legal services attorneys working in local programs or support
centers from keeping up with legal developments in their areas of practice or specialty.
280 The "mischief" that critics of the backup centers denounced during the legislative
debates was two-fold: first, specific types of activity or cases in which the centers were involved,
and second, nonclient-oriented representation. For example, there were objections to partici-
pation in school desegregation and abortion cases (119 CONG. REC. 20,717 (1973) (remarks of
Representative Green)), and such political activity as lobbying (id. at 20,721 (remarks of
Representative Conlan); 120 CONG. REC. S 968 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974) (remarks of Senator
Helms)). But participation in these types of cases and activities is dealt with in other parts of
the Act, not in § 2996e(a)(3). See notes 171, 181-82 and accompanying text supra. Section
2996e(a)(3) was designed for one purpose-to prevent entities funded by grant or contract
from engaging in nonclient-oriented activities. See 119 CONG. REC. 20,717 (1973) (remarks of
Representative Green); 120 CONG. REc. S 968 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974) (remarks of Senator
Helms). A congressional manager of the bill made this point explicit. Representative Quie
stated:
The only grants or contracts which now can be made are those for the legal advice
representation to specific clients-not general causes--having specific need of legal
counsel, and not for any general legal research, training or information service.
Id. at H 6553 (daily ed. July 16, 1974). See also id. at S 12,923 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks
of Senator Nelson).
Interpreting § 2996e(a)(3) to apply to only nonclient-oriented activities is consistent with a
general theme of the Act which makes the distinction between client and nonclient-oriented
activities in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974)
(demonstrations, picketing, boycotting and strikes); id. § 2996f(b)(6) (organizing).
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activities,2 81 training in specialized substantive areas of the law, 282
and technical assistance unrelated to specific cases. These distinc-
tions, at least, are relatively easy to make. The distinction between
research performed for a specific client and other types of research
is impossible to draw. It requires a comprehensive examination of
the research performed by backup centers.283 The Corporation has
undertaken such a study, and the results will allow the Corporation
to make an informed decision about permissible backup center
functions.
Nevertheless, a liberal interpretation of section 2996e(a)(3) is, at
best, only a stopgap measure. 84 Research on a case cannot be
separated from the trial itself. Nor can courtroom experience be
separated from the preparation of model briefs and litigation hand-
books. The success of multifunctional backup centers was fostered
by the integration of functions. The lawyer who researched, also
litigated and developed model briefs out of his accumulated experi-
ence. Divorcing the functions may lower the quality of backup assis-
tance.285 It may also create problems for legal services attorneys in
need of support. Must they turn to the Corporation for research
assistance and elsewhere for litigation assistance? The already over-
worked staff attorneys may not have time to coordinate effectively
their separate sources of assistance.286
Most disturbing, however, is the possibility that present backup
center personnel will not remain in a legal services program that
restrains their independence in the practice of law. Will they wish to
be Corporation employees who cannot litigate, or project litigators
who cannot research? This loss of backup center talent will in turn
threaten the quality and focus of the entire program. 287 Thus, the
281 This does not mean that projects cannot share copies of actual pleadings and briefs
prepared in the context of representing eligible clients. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a) (3) (Supp. IV,
1974); 120 CONG. REC. S 12,924 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
282 This does not prohibit training done within a legal services program that teaches staff
attorneys lawyering skills involved in client representation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(5) (Supp.
IV, 1974); 120 CONG. REc. S 12,923 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
283 For example, although the preparation of a model pleading might not be directly
related to providing legal services to an eligible client, the research and thought which
preceded its preparation might have been accomplished in the context of providing legal
service to eligible clients. See text accompanying note 285 infra.
284 Even this effort to preserve the program's ability to deliver high quality legal services
came under attack. See Kilpatrick, supra note 163; testimony of former Representative Edith
Green before the Board of Directors, Legal Services Corporation, Dec. 12, 1975.





opponents of legal services may yet have their victory. The solution,
of course, is repeal of the.Green Amendment, 288 but whether or not
this will be forthcoming is another question.
IV
ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
A. The Politics of Alternative Delivery Systems
1. Judicare
From the outset, relying on both legal aid and neighborhood
law office experience, the OEO Legal Services Program favored the
full-time staff-attorney. The model was familiar and seemed the
most efficient means of delivering high quality legal services to the
poor.
An alternative surfaced almost immediately, however. The Wis-
consin bar sponsored a "Judicare" program to compensate private
practitioners for providing legal service to the poor. Eligible clients
were to obtain Judicare cards which would entitle them to receive
service from any participating attorney. The attorneys would then
forward their bills to the program office for payment. 28 9 The Wis-
consin proposal had strong congressional support,290 but the Office
of Legal Services (OLS) and the organized bar were less than en-
thusiastic. The overriding concern of OLS was that Judicare would
cost more than staff-attorney delivery. The OLS also worried about
a private attorney's ability to perceive the broad implications of his
poor client's legal problem and about the potential conflicts of inter-
est between paying and Judicare clients.291 The organized bar pre-
ferred staff-attorney delivery because it saw Judicare as attracting
only less qualified attorneys.292 There was also some concern that if
OLS supported Judicare, it would receive only Judicare proposals
for local projects.2 93 Thus OLS, supported by the National Advisory
288 See text accompanying note 271 supra.
289 See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 117-18. See generally S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE:
PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE (1974).
290 See JUSTICE & REFORM 118.
291 See id. at 118-20; Note, The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 DUKE L.J. 495, 588
(1969).
292 See JUSTICE & REFORM 119.
293 See id. at 118.
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Committee and the organized bar, decided to "contain" Judicare, by
reducing the Wisconsin proposal to a small program and by funding
only a few small Judicare projects in other states.294 All such pro-
grams were to be experimental, and no further funding was to be
made until after evaluation of the experiment.295
An additional reason for restricting Judicare was the extraordi-
nary hostility of many local bar groups to a federally-funded pro-
gram that offered quality legal assistance to poor clients.296 In the
first two years of LSP, state bar associations in Tennessee and Florida
passed resolutions opposing the program and urging local bar as-
sociations to oppose applications for funds.297 North Carolina
threatened to disbar any attorney who worked for federally-funded
legal services projects in that state.298 A local bar association in
California 299 and individual practitioners in Florida, 300 Pennsyl-
vania, 30' Texas,30 2 and the District of Columbia 03 sued to enjoin the
formation or operation of legal services projects. One allegation in
these suits was that staff-attorney projects deprive the poor of their
right to choose a lawyer. The Florida suit challenged the constitu-
tionality of the entire Legal Services Program.
30 4
Other hostile local bar groups took control of local legal services
projects. They quickly deferred to paying clients and opposed the
aims of the legal services program. In Houston, bar members domi-
nated the local project and refused to let it engage in outreach
efforts, group representation, or impact litigation. As a result, the
project handled domestic relations almost exclusively. 30 5 When a
legal services project began in Charlotte, North Carolina, the local
bar controlled the project to such an extent that it exercised veto
power over the handling of cases and absolutely refused to allow
class actions. The project was characterized as a dumping ground
2'94 See id.
29 See id. at 118-21. Besides Wisconsin, Judicare projects were established in New Haven,
Connecticut, rural Montana, and Alameda County, California. Later, otherJudicare projects
were started in Meriden, Connecticut, and West Virginia.
2' See id. at 89-95.
297 See id. at 95.
298 See id. at 89-90, 95.
299 See Stanislaus County Bar Ass'n v. CRLA, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 8100.05 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Stanislaus Co., Jan. 20, 1967).
300 See Troutman v. Shriver, 273 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Fla. 1967), aff'd, 417 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 923 (1970) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue).
301 See JUSTICE & REFORM, supra note 7, at 91, 92, 315 n.45, 316 n.53.
302 See Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 417 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
313 See JUSTICE & REFORM 91, 315 n.47.
304 See note 300 supra.
30- See Note, supra note 46, at 247-48.
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for cases the private bar did not want. 06 In Daytona, Florida, the
local project was also domii~ated by the bar association. As a result, it
erected unrealistic eligibility requirements, restricted attorney ac-
tivities, and segregated personnel by race. 7
2. The Choice of Delivery Systems as a Political Issue
Some opponents of the legal services program have attributed
what they regard as drawbacks of the program to staff-attorney
delivery, favoring instead a Judicare delivery system." 8 This has two
effects. First it makes the delivery system an ideological issue and
thus prevents impartial assessment of the merits of each delivery
system. Second, coming from opponents of legal services, it seems to
acknowledge thatJudicare will result in a less effective program, one
reluctant to take on entrenched interests and one with little interest
in protecting the poor.
The National Advisory Committee has suggested that Judicare
may undermine the entire legal services program.3 0 9 Opponents of
the program agree that a Judicare system at least gives private
attorneys greater control over legal services for the poor. For in-
stance, in Mississippi the state bar association attacked a local legal
services project because it engaged in impact litigation on behalf of
eligible clients. The bar association proposed to stop such litigation
by replacing the local project with Judicare.3 10 In Albuquerque, New
Mexico, the bar reacted to what it regarded as excesses of the local
legal services project by establishing a competing Judicare plan.3 11
During congressional debate on the Legal Services Corporation Act,
opponents of the program similarly urged that another delivery
system be substituted for the staff-attorney system.31 Judicare,
voucher systems, and revenue-sharing were all mentioned, 3  and
amendments requiring the adoption of Judicare were offered. 31 4
306 See id. at 248 n.55. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical
Consideration 5-24, regarding the legal ethics of this kind of control over the cases handled by
a local project.
1o7 See Note, supra note 46, at 248 n.56.
308 See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 172-79.
309 See Arnold, supra note 23, at 8.
310 See Note, supra note 46, at 255-56. The project in question, North Mississippi Rural
Legal Services, had been rated as one of the best in the nation. See id. at 255-56 n.78.
" See Note, Judicare as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Albuquerque, 1 N.M.L. REv. 595,
603-06 (1971).
312 See 119 CONG. REc. 20,702 (1973) (remarks of Representative Wiggins).
313 See 120 CONG. REC. H 3965-66 (daily ed. May 16, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Kemp). Kemp spoke of a Judicare system using vouchers of a specific dollar amount.
314 Sfe 120 CONG. REC. S 979 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974) (remarks of Senator Helms). See also
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B. The Alternative Delivery System Study
Section 2996f(g)311 of the Act, calling for a study of both the
existing staff-attorney program and "alternative and supplemental
methods of delivery. :. including judicare, vouchers, pre-paid legal
insurance, and contracts with law firms,' 316 served to mollify oppo-
nents of staff-attorney delivery by subjecting it to testing."' The
principal aim of the delivery system study is to determine which
delivery method, or combination of methods, 31 8 provides the most
economical and effective service.
To a large extent, however, the answer is clear. Every reliable
comparison of staff-attorney and Judicare delivery indicates that the
former is more effective. In a two-year experiment in Connecticut in
which welfare clients were allowed to choose either service,31 9 the
legal services office was preferred by clients3 2 0 and was potentially
less expensive.32' Another study compared the cost of handling
S 1990, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). Representative Conlan introduced an amendment grant-
ing eligible clients the right to choose their own counsel. 119 CONG. REC. 20,729 (1973).
Representative Meeds opposed the amendment, citing the high cost of Judicare and the
provision in the Act requiring a study of, among other alternatives, Judicare. Id. at 20,729.
The amendment was rejected. Id. at 20,732.
315 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g) (Supp. IV, 1974), reproduced in note 148 supra. The demonstra-
tion projects initiated under this section will furnish legal services directly to eligible clients,
even though the projects are experimental in nature. Thus, such projects must be funded by
grant or contract and cannot be run by the Corporation. See i& § 2996e(c)(1), quoted in note
190 supra.
316 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g) (Supp. IV, 1974).
3' There was general recognition however, that the existing staff-attorney system had
proved itself capable of delivering high quality legal services to millions of clients at a relatively
low cost. Thus Congress directed the Corporation to ensure that the staff-attorney system be
maintained. See 120 CONG. REC. 938 (1974) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
318 For example, there could be staff-attorney delivery supplemented byJudicare deliv-
ery for routine domestic relations matters. In Sweden and the Province of Quebec, Canada,
legal assistance programs offer clients the choice between staff attorney or Judicare represen-
tation. See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 233-35.
319 Approximately 900 welfare clients in Meriden, Connecticut, were given the choice of
taking their legal problems to the two-attorney neighborhood legal services office or to any of
40 private attorneys in the community. The staff attorneys were salaried; the Judicare
attorneys were paid at the rate of $16 per hour, funded by HEW. See Cole & Greenberger,
Staff Attorneys vs. Judicare: A Cost Analysis, 50 J. URB. L. 705 (1973).
30 The program operated from Nov. 3, 1969 to March 31, 1972. During that time, 584
welfare recipients brought 1,149 legal matters to the program, 829 to legal services office and
320 toJudicare. Two-thirds of the cases handled by the staffed office were family, commercial,
and administrative matters; two-thirds of the Judicare cases were family law matters. The
clients made this selection, choosing staff attorneys where their expertise and sympathy were
perceived as greater. Id. at 707.
2' The legal services office generally maintained records noting "actual" time spent by
each attorney on a case. Judicare attorneys submitted bills with reference to "chargeable" time
at $16 per hour. Few controls were placed on the number of hours charged to the program,
no percentage of the minimum fee standard was imposed, and no attempt to define "charge-
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divorce and bankruptcy cases in similar rural areas served by the
Wisconsin Judicare program and Michigan's Upper Peninsula Legal
Services, finding the latter far more economical.322 In the criminal
defense area, results have been similar. 323 And Judicare attorneys
have been found to be far less willing to undertake impact litiga-
tion324 and appeals.325
Although the staff-attorney method may be the only realistic
way to deliver legal services effectively,3 26 the study should be use-
ful. It will allow the Corporation to experiment with such methods
of supplementing staff-attorney delivery as vouchers, contracts with
law firms, and legal insurance plans. 327 Although none of these
able hour" was made. Only in a few instances were Judicare lawyers questioned about bills that
appeared to be out of line. The number of hours charged to the Judicare program for each
matter likely did not reflect the amount of actual time spent, but rather an estimate of what the
market would bear or a percentage of the operative minimum fee schedule. Id. at 708-09.
Legal services lawyer work hours were calculated at an hourly chargeable rate of $18.08, but
incorporating all inefficiencies were adjusted upward to $48.90 per hour by dividing actual
hours worked into the total cost of the program. Even with this upward adjustment, the
staff-attorney average cost per type of legal matter "competed closely" with that ofJudicare.
Id. at 715.
322 The Judicare attorneys charged nearly five times more per divorce and nearly six
times more per bankruptcy than did staff attorneys in the Michigan program. L. GOODMAN &
J. FEUILLAN, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE RURAL
POOR 142-44 (1972). S. BRAKEL, supra note 289, also compared the Wisconsin and Michigan
programs. The many serious methodological deficiencies of Brakel's study, however, make it
an unreliable comparison. See L. Goodman, The Methodology of the Brakel Report on
Judicare (May 1974) (unpublished memorandum, on file at the Cornell Law Review).
323 Staff-attorney delivery by public defenders is thus much less costily than Judicare
delivery by court-appointed counsel. See, e.g, Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indigent
Accused: The Effect of Argersinger, 30 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 203, 205-06 (1972).
324 Private attorneys in Wisconsin Judicare undertook virtually no impact litigation. L.
GOODMAN & J. FEUILLAN, supra note 322, at 91-92.
325 Judicare attorneys were involved in very little law reform work and no appellate
work. The lack of appeals was attributed to the $300 per case limit imposed by Wisconsin
Judicare and the inability of attorneys to obtain waivers for appeals. Comptroller General of
the United States, Report to the Congress, The Legal Services Program-Accomplishments
and Problems Faced by its Grantees 45-46 (1973). The totalJudicare fees that could be paid in
Wisconsin to one attorney were $3,000. Arguably, such a limitation operated to prevent
Judicare attorneys from developing expertise in poverty law matters. See Masotti & Corsi,
Legal Assistance for the Poor: An Analysis and Evaluation of Two Programs, 44J. URB. L. 483,497
(1967).
326 See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 136-79.
327 The legislative history does not make it clear whether there is a distinction between
alternative and supplemental delivery systems. To the extent that delivery of services by
vouchers, contracts with law firms, or legal insurance plans is too limited in scope to be
considered an alternative, it should be considered as supplemental to the staff-attorney
system. Indeed, the relevant legislative history suggests that all alternatives are to be regarded
as supplements to delivery by staff attorneys:
[T]he Corporation shall provide for comprehensive, independent study of the exist-
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supplemental techniques is an independent vehicle for providing
legal services, they each may be valuable in combination with the
regular program. Vouchers are merely a method of payment through
which legal services may be purchased subject to various restric-
tions.328 Contractual arrangements with private law firms are another
way to provide legal services. 329 Prepaid legal insurance is developing
as an additional method of arranging for legal services, most com-
monly through an open panel of lawyers similar to Judicare. 3 ' The
ing staff-attorney program as it has been funded under the present law and will be
continued under the [Act], in comparison to supplementary methods of legal services
delivery, such as judicare, vouchers, prepaid legal insurance, and so forth, using
appropriate demonstration and supplemental projects as the basis for such study ....
S. REP. No. 495, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973). See also 120 CONG. REC. S 534 (daily ed. Jan.
28, 1974) (remarks of Senator Nelson); note 148 supra.
'28 There is no legislative history indicating what Congress meant by vouchers or how
they are to be used by the Corporation in its study of alternative delivery systems. Vouchers
could be used in staff-attorney, Judicare, or law firm delivery systems. Vouchers usually have a
specified monetary value, but if left open-ended in terms of value and type of service, they are
virtually identical to Judicare cards. If vouchers have fixed values, however, bearers may have
to shop for bargain rates. Further problems are raised in designing the delivery mechanism
for a voucher system. In addition, as in Judicare programs a voucher system requires an
administrative mechanism for determining eligibility and issuing vouchers.
3129 For example, if one law firm were hired to provide all legal services in a given project,
the method of delivery would resemble a staff-attorney system. If a limited number of firms
were hired, delivery would resemble a closed-panel Judicare system. Certain types of cases,
such as divorce and bankruptcy, could be referred to private law firms. A steady referral
business would allow private firms to develop expertise and economies of scale. Hiring criteria
would have to be developed to weigh cost, quality of work (based on reputation in the legal
community), and sympathy to the problems of the client community. The type of law firm that
may be hired, however, is limited by the Act:
No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by grant or
contract, may be used-.... to make grants to or enter into contracts with any private
law firm which expends 50 percent or more of its resources and time litigating issues
in the broad interests of a majority of the public.
42 U.S.C. § 29961(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). "A private law firm is one which receives a majority
of its revenues from retainers or fees of private clients .... H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 11 (1973).
'30 A number of group insurance plans are experimenting with alternative delivery
systems, chiefly staff-attorneys, as a means to lower the cost of services. Such plans offer the
Corporation a parallel study of ways to provide cheaper, more effective delivery. See S.
MACKENZIE, GROUP LEGAL SERVICES (1975); Memorandum from Susan MacKenzie to Roger
C. Cramton, Sept. 17, 1975 (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review). See also Bartosic &
Bernstein, Group Legal Services as a Fringe Benefit: Lawyers for Forgotten Clients ThIrough Collective
Bargaining, 59 VA. L. REV. 410 (1973). The seminal article on legal insurance is Stolz, Insurance
for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 417 (1968). Many group
legal services plans assist members who are at the lower end of the income spectrum and who
encounter legal problems identical to those of the poor. For example, the legal problems of
laborers in the plan of the Laborer's District Council of Washington, D.C. are virtually
identical to those of eligible legal services clients. Interview with Jules Bernstein, General
Counsel of the Laborer's District Council, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 1975.
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Corporation may also study systems approaches to poverty law prac-
tice 33 I and alternatives to the courts for dispute resolution.
3 32
C. The Future of Legal Services
Even if the study does produce recommendations for improv-
ing the delivery of legal services, no substantial improvement can be
implemented without greater funding. The increased appropriation
for fiscal year 1976 will merely allow the Corporation to begin restor-
ing the program to its former level.333 If that restoration is made,
the program will still only meet about fifteen percent of the legal
needs of the poor. Less than 2,200 lawyers-roughly one-half of one
percent of the American bar-are working to fill the needs of the
poorest sixth of our population. 34 Moreover, over forty percent of
the poor live in areas totally unserved by legal services offices,335 and
331 The Act authorizes the Corporation to look beyond the statutory language to alterna-
tives for improving the delivery of legal services. See note 148 supra. Within the context of the
study of alternative delivery systems, every effort should be made to explore innovative ways
to provide better legal services at lower cost, such as a "systems" approach to delivery. The San
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation has developed such an approach to the
common legal problems of divorce, debt defense, and eviction defense. The systems break the
process of handling cases into steps, set forth as options, and provide form letters,
memoranda, and pleadings to implement the various options. See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 150 n.26. Use of such a systems approach in some of the experimental projects
mounted for the alternative delivery study would give the Corporation important information
on its utility.
Where consistent with Canon 3 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY,
greater reliance on the services of paraprofessionals, especially for routine legal matters, is
another alternative that should be studied as a means of improving the delivery of legal
services. The legal services program has already made significant progress in this area. See
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REPRESENTATION OF CITIZEN INTERESTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, REDUCING THE COSTS OF LEGAL SERVICES 9-11 (Comm. Print 1974).
'3' For example, staff attorneys in the legal services program in Cleveland developed a
mechanism for arbitrating tenants' disputes with one particular landlord. Subsequently, they
established a project designed to facilitate the arbitration of disputes between the poor and
participating area landlords and merchants. See Massotti & Corsi, supra note 325, at 496. An
OEO-funded private ombudsman was established in Buffalo, New York, as a means of
supplementing the delivery of legal services to the poor. The ombudsman handled complaints
by the poor against the city and county government by informal negotiation. See Hollands,
Ombudsman in Butffalo, 26 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 224 (1968); Samore, Legal Services for the Poor,
32 ALBANY L. REV. 509, 519 (1968). The success of this approach needs to be studied, and if
appropriate, similar approaches could be included in demonstration projects.
333 See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra; Legal Services Appropriation Hearings, supra
note 135, at 23.
334 See Cramton, supra note 135, at 1343.
335 See id. The historical reasons for this funding pattern are explained in JUSTICE &
REFORM, supra note 7, at 188-91. See also L. GOODMAN & M. WALKER, THE LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM: RESOURCE DISTRmBUION AND THE LOW INCOME POPULATION 7-10 (Bureau of Social
Science Research, 1975).
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such coverage as exists is often nominal rather than effective. 336 A
legal services program providing adequate coverage would cost close
to $500 million per year.337 Meanwhile, in the United States the
amount spent per capita on the program is one-fourth of what
several other nations spend.
33 8
In addition to requiring a greater financial commitment by
Congress, the courts must assume an important role if this nation's
poor are to enjoy their legal rights. The Legal Services Corporation
and the existing network of legal services projects provide an institu-
tional framework on which to build a constitutional right to counsel
in civil cases. Regretably, after taking tentative steps toward a decla-
ration of that right, the courts have pulled back. 339 Unless Congress
and the courts move forward together, on both the financial and
constitutional fronts, equal justice will remain an empty phrase, an
unmet promise.
CONCLUSION
The Legal Services Corporation Act is a promising develop-
ment for the legal services program. So long as the program is
shielded from political interference and pressure, its attorneys will
be able to focus their energies on providing clients with the best
service possible. But the Act provides no guarantee that the pro-
gram will not once again become embroiled in political controversy.
The Corporation must approach Congress every year for renewed
funding. As in the past, the annual appropriations battle may foster
attempts to limit the scope of the program, or perhaps what is worse,
the program itself may become timid in asserting the rights of its
poor clients, so as to preserve its funding. Battles over directorships
may also recur, presenting the possibility that the program could
again be immobilized. Moreover, the effectiveness of the program
has been threatened by a political deal limiting the activities of
336 See L. GOODMAN & M. WALKER, supra note 335, at 11-59.
337 An adequate program would cost at least $473,383,668:
That is, a 23 per cent incidence of legal problems in a poor population of 28,987,685
means an estimated national incidence of 6,667,168 problems per year. This number
divided by 500 [cases per attorney per year] works out to 13,334 attorneys. At the rate
of $35,502 per attorney, on the average, the total cost is $473,383,668.
Id. at 63.
338 See TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 234 n. 203.
339 See Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 674-80
(1976).
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backup centers, and the Act does not rule out other such deals in the
future.
If the Act is not cause for rejoicing, however, there is at least
reason for cautious optimism. The legal services program is finally
free from the executive branch, governors no longer have vetos
over grants in their states, there has been some increase in funding
for the program, and Congress is considering repeal of the Green
Amendment. Perhaps most important, the program is once again in
the hands of capable leaders who are committed to the development
of the legal services program.
